Luke Raymond Stewart -v- The State of Western Australia

Document Type: Decision

Matter Number: M 52/2025

Matter Description: Industrial Relations Act 1979 - Alleged breach of Act

Industry:

Jurisdiction: Industrial Magistrate

Member/Magistrate name: INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE R. COSENTINO

Delivery Date: 19 Nov 2026

Result: Preliminary issue determined

Citation: 2026 WAIRC 01020

WAIG Reference:

DOCX | 77kB
2026 WAIRC 01020
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA


CITATION
:
2026 WAIRC 01020



CORAM
:
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE R. COSENTINO



HEARD
:
ON THE PAPERS



DELIVERED
:
THURSDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 2026



FILE NO.
:
M 52 OF 2025



BETWEEN
:
LUKE RAYMOND STEWART


CLAIMANT





AND





THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA


RESPONDENT

CatchWords : INDUSTRIAL LAW (WA) – preliminary issue – determining whether individual is employee or person is employer – s 7A of Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) – whether s 7A applies to pre-commencement employment – statutory construction – rule or presumption against retrospectivity – no transitional provisions – held s 7A applies to pre-commencement employment
Legislation : Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA)
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA)
Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA)
Cases referred
to in reasons: : ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1
Amuta v Director-General, Department of Communities [2025] WAIRC 00881; (2025) 105 WAIG 2622
Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia [2012] HCA 19; (2012) 246 CLR 117
Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin [1978] UKPC 7; (1978) 18 ALR 385
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165
Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut [2002] NSWCA 18; (2002) 119 LGERA 171
Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261
Muller v Timbecon Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 42; (2023) 324 IR 132
Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] UKPC 37
Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77
Rodway v The Queen [1990] HCA 19; (1990) 169 CLR 515
Stephens v The Queen [2022] HCA 31; (2022) 273 CLR 635
Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16
The Commissioner of Police v Ferguson [2019] WASCA 14; (2019) 54 WAR 177
The State of Western Australia v Williams [2022] WASCA 105; (2022) 300 A Crim R 515
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456
Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2008] WASCA 188; (2008) 38 WAR 217
ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2; (2022) 275 CLR 254
Result : Preliminary issue determined
Representation:
Claimant : Self-represented
Respondent : Ms E. Negus (of counsel)



REASONS FOR DECISION
1 The claimant, Mr Luke Stewart, claims that the respondent, through the Director General, Department of Water and Environmental Regulation, contravened s 97D(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) by representing that he was an independent contractor, and not an employee.
2 Section 97D(1) says:
An employer must not represent to an employee that a contract of employment is a contract for services.
3 The claimant’s Substituted Grounds for his claim are lengthy, particularising the formation of a Written Contract for Services between him and the Department on 18 July 2024 and nine variations to the Written Contract for Services between 18 July 2024 and September 2024. The representations which the claimant says contravened s 97D(1) are alleged to have been made ‘From 18 July 2024 onwards’ and include representations allegedly made on 11 January 2025 and 15 January 2025. See the claimant’s substituted originating claim – grounds dated 31 March 2026.

4 Fundamental to the claim is that the claimant was at law an employee and not an independent contractor when he performed work for the Department after 18 July 2024. If he is properly categorised as an independent contractor, there can be no misrepresentation or contravention of s 97D(1) by virtue of a representation that he was an independent contractor. The claim therefore calls for the application of a test for whether he was an employee or an independent contractor.
5 The claimant performed work for the Department under the Written Contract for Services from June 2024 to the end of December 2024.
6 On 31 January 2025, the IR Act was amended to insert s 7A which says:
Determining whether individual is employee or person is employer
(1) This section applies for determining, for the purposes of this Act, the LSL Act or the MCE Act —
(a) whether an individual is an employee of a person; or
(b) whether a person is an employer of an individual.
(2) The matter is determined by ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), consideration must be given to the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person, including —
(a) the terms of the contract governing the relationship; and
(b) other factors relevant to the totality of the relationship, including how the contract is performed in practice.
Note for this section:
This section was enacted as a response to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2.
7 Before s 7A was enacted, the common law as to whether a relationship was one of employment or of principal and contractor was articulated by the High Court’s decisions in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165 (Personnel Contracting) and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2; (2022) 275 CLR 254. I will refer to these together as the High Court Decisions.
8 It is accepted that s 7A had the effect of modifying the common law test articulated in the High Court Decisions.
9 The respondent maintains that the s 7A test does not apply, but rather the common law test applies because the claim relates to an engagement that existed, and work that was performed, before 31 January 2025. That is, before s 7A was enacted.
10 Mr Stewart claims the test for whether he was an employee is the test in s 7A.
11 On the respondent’s application, on 3 August 2026 I ordered that the question of whether s 7A applied to the claimant’s engagement be determined as a preliminary issue on the papers pursuant to reg 7(1)(i) of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA).
12 The particular question these reasons answer is ‘Does s 7A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) apply to the period of a relationship before s 7A commenced (being before 31 January 2025)?’ The answer to this question lies in the correct construction of s 7A.
Relevant Principles
13 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The applicable principles are well-known. A conventional statement of the approach was given by Buss J in the Industrial Appeal Court decision of The Commissioner of Police v Ferguson [2019] WASCA 14; (2019) 54 WAR 177 at [70]  [73]:
In Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ observed:
‘This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text’ (Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]; [2009] HCA 41). So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself [39].
See also Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Thiess v Collector of Customs.
The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The statutory text is the surest guide to Parliament's intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the existing state of the law, the history of the legislative scheme and the general purpose and policy of the provision (in particular, the mischief it is seeking to remedy). See CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue.
The purpose of legislation must be derived from the statutory text and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions. See Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross. The intended reach of a legislative provision is to be discerned from the words of the provision and not by making an a priori assumption about its purpose. See Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd.
As Crennan J noted in Northern Territory v Collins, ‘[s]econdary material seeking to explain the words of a statute cannot displace the clear meaning of the text of a provision (Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 228 CLR 529 at 538 [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 11), not least because such material may confuse what was “intended … with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed” (Hilder v Dexter [1902] AC 474 at 477 per Earl of Halsbury LC)’. That statement of principle applies to extrinsic evidence admissible at common law and also to extrinsic evidence admissible under s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). In other words, the statutory text, and not non‑statutory language seeking to explain the statutory text, is paramount. See Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd. (footnotes omitted)
14 At common law, there is a rule or principle of construction, commonly referred to as a presumption against giving a statute retrospective operation. This principle was described by the Court of Appeal in Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77 (Lawrence) at [95]  [100]:
There is no doubt that the Parliament of Western Australia has the capacity to pass legislation with retrospective effect. It is said, however, that: ‘[r]etrospective legislation is somewhat 'distasteful' - even more so when retrospective legislation takes away accrued rights’. The resistance of the law to retrospectivity in legislation is to be found in the rule - often expressed in terms of being a ‘presumption’ - that, save where the legislature makes its intention clear, a statute ought not to be given retrospective operation where to do so would be to attach new legal consequences to facts or events which occurred before its commencement.
In terms of stating the relevant principle, the general common law rule as stated by Dixon CJ in Maxwell v Murphy is one that is often referred to:
[A] statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.
So too is the following statement of Fullagar J in Fisher v Hebburn:
There can be no doubt that the general rule is that an amending enactment - or, for that matter, any enactment - is prima facie to be construed as having a prospective operation only. That is to say, it is prima facie to be construed as not attaching new legal consequences to facts, or events which occurred before its commencement.
While often referred to as a ‘presumption’, the principle is, we consider, better understood as a rule of statutory construction. As was said by French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia, in the context of discussing the principle, in the end the court must construe statutes by reference to their text, context and purpose. The rule of construction fits within, not outside of, the general approach to statutory construction; it is not controlling but is part of the process of construction to be undertaken by the court. Accordingly, if the rule ought to be considered when construing s 32(1) of the Supreme Court Act [1938 (WA)], the starting point in construing s 32(1) remains the text of the statutory provision which must be read and understood in its context and by giving effect to the apparent legislative purpose.
The presumptive rule of construction is rooted in fairness and the principle of legality. It is founded on a presumption of common sense that in a well-ordered and civilized society the legislature would not intend what is unjust. To again refer to the reasons of French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Australian Education Union:
In a representative democracy governed by the rule of law, it can be assumed that clear language will be used by the Parliament in enacting a statute which falsifies, retroactively, existing legal rules upon which people have ordered their affairs, exercised their rights and incurred liabilities and obligations.
The rule does not apply to a provision that is merely procedural in the narrow sense, ie a provision that would not, if given unconfined operation, affect pre-existing substantive rights or liabilities. Often such statutory provisions only operate prospectively - prescribing how something may or must be done in the future even if what is to be done relates to or is based on past events - and there is no room for the operation of the presumption. It is accepted, however, that:
the difference between substantive law and procedure is often difficult to draw and statutes which are commonly classified as procedural - statutes of limitation, for example - may operate in such a way as to affect existing rights or obligations. When they operate in that way they are not merely procedural and they fall within the presumption against retrospective operation.
(footnotes omitted)
15 The rule does not apply to cases where the provision under consideration merely takes account of antecedent facts and circumstances as a basis for what it prescribes for the future and does no more than that. As French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ stated in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia [2012] HCA 19; (2012) 246 CLR 117 (Australian Education Union) at [26], ‘interference with existing rights does not make a statute retrospective.’
16 The concept of rights and liabilities for the purpose of the presumptive rule is not narrow, and may encompass entitlements that fall short of enforceable legal rights, inchoate rights, obligations and liabilities. Lawrence [130].
However, a mere hope or expectation that a right will be created does not attract the presumption. Pearce DC, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th ed, 2024) [10.15].

17 The Court of Appeal in Lawrence described the presumptive rule as ‘rooted in fairness and the principle of legality.’ The High Court in Stephens v The Queen [2022] HCA 31; (2022) 273 CLR 635 (Stephens) identified ‘reasonable expectations’ as underlying fairness:
[T]he reason for regarding retrospective law-making as unjust is that it disappoints the justified expectations of those who, in acting, have relied on the assumption that the legal consequences of their acts will be determined by the known state of the law established at the time of their acts. Stephens [33] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman & Gleeson JJ) quoting Hart HLA, The Concept of Law (3rd ed, 2012) 276.

18 The force of the rule therefore depends on the circumstances; the less a provision would defeat reasonable expectations, and the less injustice it will cause, the less force will be in the presumption against retrospective operation. Stephens [34] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman & Gleeson JJ).
Consequently, the resistance of the common law to construing statutes as taking effect before their enactment is graduated, according to the extent of their propounded effect. Australian Education Union [31] (French CJ, Crennan & Kiefel JJ).
So, in Lawrence at [113], the Court of Appeal said: ‘where a retrospective operation might be considered to work some injustice to one party, but is clearly required to rectify a manifest injustice to others, there is, in principle, little reason to give much weight to the presumption.’
19 The rule will not preclude a provision from having a retrospective operation if the legislature’s intention for it to operate retrospectively appears with reasonable certainty from the text and context of the provision in question. Lawrence [108] - [111].

Respondent’s Submissions
20 The respondent contends that s 7A does not apply to periods of a working relationship that predate its commencement on 31 January 2025. The respondent submits that any application of s 7A to an earlier period would constitute a retrospective operation of the legislation and therefore engage the established presumption against retrospectivity.
21 The respondent acknowledges that, viewed superficially, s 7A might appear to operate only prospectively because it directs the Industrial Magistrates Court (IMC) and the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission on how to determine an individual’s employment status after the provision commenced. However, the respondent argues that this characterisation overlooks the practical effect of the provision. If applied to relationships existing before 31 January 2025, then s 7A would alter the legal consequences of past events and therefore have a retrospective effect in substance.
22 The respondent submits that, if s 7A were applied to pre-commencement periods, a relationship that was not legally characterised as one of employment under the High Court Decisions could subsequently be found to be an employment relationship under the new statutory test. Such an outcome would alter rights and liabilities that had already accrued under the law as it stood at the relevant time, and therefore falls squarely within the kind of retrospective operation described in authorities concerning retrospectivity.
23 The respondent emphasises that, immediately prior to the enactment of s 7A, parties had organised their affairs on the basis of their contracts, the applicable statutes and the prevailing common law. Their rights and obligations had crystallised through the performance of work and other past events. According to the respondent, applying s 7A to those past periods would retrospectively re-characterise those relationships and thereby modify established legal rights and obligations.
24 Particular emphasis is placed on the practical consequences for persons subsequently found to be employers. The respondent argues that retrospective application could expose such parties to liability for breaches of employment obligations, including leave entitlements, record-keeping requirements, underpayment claims and civil penalties, despite those obligations not applying to them when the relevant conduct occurred. It is submitted that preventing precisely this type of unfair outcome is the purpose of the presumption against retrospectivity.
25 The respondent also relies on the ‘reasonable expectations’ analysis discussed by the High Court in Stephens and the rationale for the presumption explained in Australian Education Union. It is argued that contracting parties reasonably expect their rights, liabilities and the fundamental character of their contractual relationship to be determined according to the law in force when the contract was made and performed. The High Court Decisions are said to have been legal rules upon which parties arranged their affairs, and clear statutory language would therefore be required before Parliament could be taken to have displaced those expectations.
26 Finally, the respondent contends that no such clear indication appears in s 7A or elsewhere in the legislation. The provision is said to be silent on temporal operation and contains nothing comparable to the express retrospective wording considered in Australian Education Union (being ‘taken ... to have always been valid’). The respondent further notes that s 7A was modelled on s 15AA of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA), while pointing out that the Commonwealth legislation expressly only applies prospectively. These matters are relied upon to submit that the presumption against retrospectivity has not been displaced and that s 7A applies only from 31 January 2025 onwards.
Claimant’s Submissions
27 The claimant submits that the IR Act is beneficial and remedial legislation and as such, should be construed liberally, rather than literally or technically.
28 The claimant relies on various extrinsic materials to identify the mischief addressed by the legislation and Parliament’s intended operation of s 7A.
29 According to the claimant, the parliamentary debates demonstrate that Parliament regarded the High Court Decisions as having disrupted the established approach to distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Statements by the Hon Matthew Swinbourn, Parliamentary Secretary, described the legislative purpose as restoring the pre-2022 position and ‘return[ing] it back to what it was’, rather than creating new rights or forms of employment. Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 5 November 2026, 5750 (Hon Mr M Swinbourn, Parliamentary Secretary).

30 The claimant emphasises that Parliament repeatedly described s 7A as restoring a methodology that requires consideration of the totality of the relationship, including both contractual terms and the manner in which the relationship was performed in practice. Parliamentary debate highlighted concerns that written contracts may not always reflect the practical reality of working arrangements and that courts should look beyond contractual labels where necessary.
31 Particular reliance is placed upon parliamentary discussions of historical employment claims. The claimant notes that the Parliamentary Secretary expressly contemplated circumstances where a worker, after a relationship spanning 20 years had ended, might commence proceedings seeking annual leave or long service leave on the basis that the relationship had been one of employment. The claimant argues that the speech assumes that the effect of inserting s 7A would be to enable the courts to determine the character of such long-standing historical relationships under the s 7A methodology.
32 The claimant submits that Parliament’s response to concerns about historical claims is especially significant. Rather than stating that pre-commencement relationships would remain governed by the approach of the High Court Decisions, Parliament responded by explaining that claims by genuinely independent contractors would not succeed merely by the introduction of s 7A. Again, this explanation would be unnecessary if s 7A only operated prospectively.
33 The claimant accepts the orthodox presumption against legislation retrospectively affecting accrued rights and liabilities but argues that the relevant authorities, including Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261, The State of Western Australia v Williams [2022] WASCA 105; (2022) 300 A Crim R 515, Rodway v The Queen [1990] HCA 19; (1990) 169 CLR 515 and Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2008] WASCA 188; (2008) 38 WAR 217, distinguishes between legislation that alters existing rights, and legislation that takes account of antecedent facts when making a later determination. The claimant submits that s 7A falls into the latter category because it prescribes the considerations relevant to determining status and does not itself alter contracts, work previously performed, remuneration paid, or historical conduct.
34 The claimant further argues that the respondent has failed to identify any accrued right to have an individual’s employment status determined under the High Court Decisions methodology. Reliance is placed on ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1 as an example of legislation affecting a clearly accrued statutory entitlement, contrasted with s 7A, which is said only to govern how courts characterise an existing relationship.
35 In this regard, the claimant’s submissions rely upon Muller v Timbecon Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 42; (2023) 324 IR 132 as demonstrating that parties do not possess an accrued right to have their status assessed according to the methodology that existed when the relationship was formed or performed. In that case, the employment status was determined according to the High Court Decisions even though the relationship had largely occurred before the High Court Decisions were delivered.
36 The claimant submits that the respondent’s construction creates substantial practical difficulties for relationships that span a period before and after 31 January 2025. If the respondent’s construction is correct, either the old methodology would continue indefinitely for pre-existing relationships, or an otherwise unchanged relationship would need to be divided into separate periods governed by different tests. The claimant contends that neither outcome is reflected in the text of s 7A and both create artificial complexity, particularly in relation to long service leave claims.
37 The claimant points to s 97D of the IR Act as relevant context for the construction task. The claimant notes that the prohibition in s 97D on misrepresenting an employment relationship commenced in June 2022, whereas s 7A commenced in January 2025. He argues that s 7A did not create the distinction between employee and contractor or the prohibition itself, but merely altered the methodology used to determine into which category a worker falls.
38 The claimant contends that Parliament could have enacted transitional provisions in relation to the operation of s 7A, but it did not. He notes that the Commonwealth Parliament regulated the temporal operation of s 15AA of the FWA when it was enacted, by way of transitional provisions. He also notes that s 119 and s 123 of the IR Act, inserted by the Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (WA) (IRLA Act), are transitional provisions that expressly preserve the former law for certain categories of ‘pre-commencement behaviour’ including bullying and sexual harassment matters. The claimant argues that these sections demonstrate that Parliament knew how to preserve previous law when it intended to do so.
39 The absence of any equivalent transitional provision for employment characterisation under s 7A is said to be significant context. However, the claimant accepts it does not displace the presumption against retrospective operation.
40 In summary, the claimant submits that the application of s 7A to determinations made after its commencement is not retrospective, invoking the presumption, because the section regulates the process of determining an individual’s status rather than altering accrued rights or liabilities. Alternatively, if the presumption is engaged, the claimant submits that the text, context, purpose, legislative history and parliamentary materials disclose a sufficiently clear contrary intention to displace the presumption against retrospectivity.
41 The claimant contends that Parliament enacted s 7A specifically to displace the High Court Decisions’ methodology, and there is no textual or contextual basis for preserving that methodology indefinitely for historical working relationships.
The Effect of s 7A on the Common Law Position
42 Before grappling with the question of whether the construction of s 7A that the claimant contends for is retrospective, it is useful to recap the effect of s 7A on the common law position. What change in the law does s 7A effect? How does s 7A operate?
43 The reasons of Keifel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ (the plurality) in the Personnel Contracting articulate the common law principles that had developed concerning the identification of an employment relationship. The plurality did not purport to effect a change to the common law test by which the totality of the relationship between the parties must be assessed, nor to depart from the multifactorial test in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16. Personnel Contracting [55]  [56].
The plurality affirmed that where parties have comprehensively committed the term of their relationship to a written contract the validity of which is not in dispute, the characterisation of the relationship proceeds by reference to the rights and obligations under the contract: [59]. They went on to say at [61]:
The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that it is not appropriate, in the characterisation of a relationship as one of employment or of principal and independent contractor, to consider the ‘totality of the relationship between the parties’ by reference to the various indicia of employment that have been identified in the authorities. (footnotes omitted)
44 The plurality criticised the manner in which the multifactorial test was applied, describing the manner of application as ‘problematic’. Personnel Contracting [32].
The concern was that the test had come to be applied as a ‘mechanistic counting of ticks’, Personnel Contracting [39].
treating the test as superseding or rejecting the authoritative settled law in Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin [1978] UKPC 7; (1978) 18 ALR 385 and Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] UKPC 37. Personnel Contracting [47].

45 The High Court Decisions are said to represent a shift in how courts in Australia had traditionally approached the question of employment status by applying a multifactorial test extending to post contractual performance of the contract. See, for example, Explanatory Memorandum, Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (WA) [78]: ‘The High Court departed from longstanding jurisprudence that applied a multi-factorial assessment of whether a relationship was one of employee and employer.’
It is difficult to know the extent to which the shift would result in different outcomes in practical reality. In Personnel Contracting, Gageler and Gleeson JJ approached the question of employment status in accordance with the traditional multifactorial approach looking at the totality of the relationship and arrived at the same conclusion as the plurality. That is, both approaches resulted in a finding that the worker was the respondent’s employee.
46 The plurality’s reasons leave scope for the consideration of the parties’ subsequent conduct as relevant in a variety of scenarios, including:
(a) where the contract is not wholly in writing but is wholly or partly oral, so that subsequent conduct may aid the construction of the contract’s terms;
(b) where the written contract has been varied, discharged or replaced by a new oral contract;
(c) where the written contract was a sham from the outset because it did not reflect the true agreement between the parties; and
(d) where the conduct of the relationship might lead to a party being estopped from relying on the terms of the contract. See Personnel Contracting [42]  [43], [46], [54]; see also Munton JR, ‘Boundary Disputes: Employment v Independent Contracting in the High Court’ (2022) 35(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 79.

47 It is uncontentious that s 7A was enacted ‘as a response to’ the High Court Decisions. As much is stated in the note published following s 7A.
48 Like s 15AA of the FWA, which commenced operation on 26 August 2024, the effect of s 7A is to essentially override a single aspect of the precedent established by the High Court Decisions. Section 7A mandates consideration of how the contract is or was performed in practice, when determining if an individual was an employee, as well as to the terms of the contract.
49 Section 7A requires consideration of matters which, in at least some cases, would not be considered under the approach advocated by the plurality in the High Court Decisions.
50 In many cases, including those described in [46] above, or where there is no substantive difference between the obligations established by the contract, and the way the contract is carried out in practice, there might be no difference between a s 7A approach and the common law approach. It is only when there is a divergence between the obligations established by the contractual terms, and the performance of the contract in practice, that the operation of s 7A will lead to a different legal conclusion as to the status of a relationship as one of employment or of principal and independent contractor.
Does the Rule/Presumption Against Retrospectivity Arise?
51 The claimant’s primary submission is that the application of s 7A to a pre31 January 2025 relationship is not retrospective.
52 The claimant accepts that the application of s 7A to a working relationship that existed before 31 January 2025, may produce a different conclusion as to employment status, compared to if s 7A was not applied. It follows that substantive rights and liabilities may consequently be found to have existed, which would not otherwise have been found to exist. Claimant’s written submissions on the preliminary issue dated 31 August 2026 [53].

53 The claimant argues, however, that employment status, and its associated rights and liabilities, should not be regarded as a matter which is ‘fixed’ at an earlier point in time. Further, he says that as these are not fixed matters, they are not caught by the presumption, relying on Dixon J’s formulation of the rule in Maxwell v Murphy.
54 Dixon J’s statement of the rule in Maxwell v Murphy is at 267:
The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events. But, given rights and liabilities fixed by reference to past facts, matters or events, the law appointing or regulating the manner in which they are to be enforced or their enjoyment is to be secured by judicial remedy is within the application of such a presumption.
55 Dixon J does not articulate the general rule by reference to ‘fixed’ rights and liabilities. His Honour states that the general rule applies on ‘rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.’ His Honour uses the word ‘fixed’ when articulating the exception to the rule, not the rule itself. In this context, the claimant places more weight on the word ‘fixed’ than the passage can bear.
56 In Amuta v Director-General, Department of Communities [2025] WAIRC 00881; (2025) 105 WAIG 2622 (Amuta), Commissioner Tsang was required to consider whether s 7B of the IR Act applied to periods of employment that predated the section’s commencement. Section 7B, like s 7A, was inserted with effect from 31 January 2025. It contains criteria for determining whether an employee is a casual employee. A note to the section indicates it was enacted as a response to the High Court decision of WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456.
57 Commissioner Tsang construed s 7B as not applying retrospectively on the basis that it applies only to post31 January 2025 claims, although it must be applied to pre31 January 2025 periods of employment relevant to such claims. See Amuta [39]  [41].
Strictly speaking, the construction the Commissioner gave to s 7B is that it operates retrospectively but not retroactively. In other words, it operated retrospectively in the broad sense. The Commissioner was compelled to this conclusion by the need to give full effect to the text of s 7B which requires consideration of the totality of the employment relationship. The effect of the Commissioner’s reasoning is that the presumption against any retrospective operation was displaced by the text of s 7B itself.
58 In my view, applying s 7A to a pre-commencement period would attach legal significance to antecedent facts and may alter the rights and responsibilities arising from those facts. The presumption against retrospectivity is therefore engaged.
59 The respondent submits that the strength of the presumption is ‘at least moderately strong’ because if s 7A were to apply retrospectively, it would significantly affect pre-existing rights and liabilities of the parties, including by giving rise to civil penalty contraventions on the employer.
60 I disagree. In my view the presumption is weak. This is for three reasons.
61 First, in cases lying near the boundary between employment and independent contracting, characterisation of the true legal status of the parties’ relationship is not self-evident under the common law test. The correct characterisation is a mixed question of fact and law requiring an evaluative assessment. There may be genuine contestability as to the proper conclusion unless and until the issue is determined by a court or tribunal.
62 The existence of reasonable expectations does not depend upon certainty of outcome. However, where the legal characterisation of a relationship is evaluative and contestable, the extent to which those expectations are undermined by legislative change may be less significant than where legislation alters fixed proprietary or vested rights. Put another way, the contestable nature of the enquiry diminishes the strength of any expectation that the relationship will be characterised in a particular way.
63 Second, as I discussed at [45]  [50] above, the test for employment status under s 7A and the test at common law have significant features in common. The multifactorial analysis is relevant under both tests, and there are a variety of circumstances where post-contractual conduct will be relevant for the purposes of the common law test. There is a relatively narrow area where s 7A would operate to create new obligations or liabilities where they would not otherwise exist.
64 Finally, where contractual relationships were entered into before the High Court Decisions were delivered, there could be no reasonable expectations based on the principles that emerged from them.
65 In this context, while the presumption against retrospectivity applies, it is a weak presumption that can be displaced with relative ease. The real question is whether the text, context and purpose of s 7A demonstrate a sufficiently clear legislative intention to displace the weak presumption.
Is the Presumption Displaced by a Clear Legislative Intent?
Section 7A’s Text
66 I start with the text of the section itself. Section 7A is expressed in the present tense. By s 8 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), whenever a matter is expressed in the present tense, it is applied to the circumstances as they arise to give effect to the law according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.
67 Nothing in the text of s 7A expressly confines its operation to relationships entered into after 31 January 2025. Nor does the text distinguish between ongoing and completed relationships.
68 The plain, natural, straightforward meaning of s 7A is that it applies when presently assessing a relationship, regardless of when the relationship commenced and regardless of when the relationship subsisted.
69 On the other hand, a reading of s 7A which precludes its application to a period of employment prior to 31 January 2025 is strained, and not apparent on the face of the text.
70 At its core, s 7A calls for consideration of the ‘practical realities’ and ‘totality’ of a relationship. These words are flexible expressions, directing the focus to the way things actually operate and the substance of a relationship as opposed to narrow, technical, or formal aspects. This feature of the text also points towards a broad and encompassing temporal application. It is somewhat inconsistent with the text to require a compartmentalised analysis of an employment relationship, with different legal tests being applied at different times.
The Statutory Context
71 I now turn to the statutory context. Section 7A of the IR Act is not an operative provision. It forms part of Part I – Introductory, and follows s 7 which contains definitions of terms used in the IR Act.
72 Because it is not an operative provision, it is always read together with other provisions of the IR Act as well as the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) (MCE Act) and the Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA) (LSL Act). Most importantly, it is always read together with the definition of ‘employee’ in s 7 and often with the definition of ‘employer’ in s 7. Those definitions are:
employee means –
(a) an individual who is employed by an employer to do work for hire or reward, including as an apprentice; or
(b) an individual whose usual status is that of an employee;
Note for this definition:
See section 7A which applies for the purposes of determining whether an individual is an employee of a person.
employer means –
(a) a person or public authority employing 1 or more employees; or
(aa) in relation to an industrial matter mentioned in section 36AA — the employing authority of a public service officer or health services employee; or
(b) except as provided in the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Commonwealth) section 12, a foreign state or consulate employing 1 or more employees; or
(c) a labour hire agency or group training organisation that arranges for an employee (being a person who is a party to a contract of service with the agency or organisation) to do work for another person, even though the employee is working for the other person under an arrangement between the agency or organisation and the other person;
Note for this definition:
See section 7A which applies for the purposes of determining whether a person is an employer of an individual.
73 Pearce’s Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th ed) at [10.29] contains the following extract from Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut:
[I]t must always be remembered that any amendment to the definition section of an Act or Statutory Instrument, actually amends each section of the Act or clause of the instrument where the relevant word or expression is employed. Such an amendment thus, unless plainly indicated, is almost always construed as operating prospectively only. (emphasis added) Pearce DC, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th ed, 2024) [10.29] quoting Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut [2002] NSWCA 18; (2002) 119 LGERA 171 [68] (Young CJ in Eq).

74 Construing s 7A requires consideration of its intended effect when read together with the definitions of employee and employer in s 7 and all and any of the provisions of the IR Act, the LSL Act and the MCE Act which invoke those definitions. These are numerous. The existence of a relationship between an employee and an employer is key to the vast bulk of the operation of the IR Act, the LSL Act and the MCE Act.
75 The application of s 7A includes:
(a) determining whether a person is entitled to long service leave under the LSL Act, and determining the period of continuous service for accrual of long service leave.
(b) determining whether a person is entitled to statutory minimum rates of pay; personal leave; annual leave; bereavement leave; family and domestic violence leave; the ability to request flexible working arrangements; notice of termination; and other minimum conditions of employment provided for by the MCE Act. MCE Act s 3, s 5.

(c) determining whether a matter is an industrial matter over which the Commission has jurisdiction. IR Act s 7, s 23.

(d) determining whether a person is an employer and therefore able to be party to an industrial agreement or is bound by an award. IR Act s 37B, s 41.

76 The claimant says that the IR Act is beneficial and remedial legislation and so it should be construed liberally. The LSL Act and the MCE Act are beneficial and protective. Particular parts of the IR Act, such as s 23A providing remedies for unfair dismissal; Part 2 Division 3AA which includes stop bullying and sexual harassment provisions, and Part 6B – Protection of Employee Rights, can also be described as protective, beneficial or remedial. But I do not consider that the IR Act as a whole can be characterised as beneficial, remedial or protective. Rather, the IR Act has many functions, purposes and objects. The short title of the IR Act describes it as an Act to:
[C]onsolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention and resolution of conflict in respect of industrial matters, the mutual rights and duties of employers and employees, their rights and duties of organisation of employers and employees, and for related purposes.
77 Reference to the IR Act’s objects in s 6 and the list in s 26 of considerations which the Commission must have regard to in determining industrial matters is sufficient to demonstrate that the IR Act is not only beneficial legislation. Accordingly, it would be erroneous to treat the introductory provisions, including s 7A, as ‘beneficial’ and so calling for a liberal interpretation.
78 Although some provisions of the IR Act, the MCE Act and the LSL Act have a beneficial or protective character, little assistance is gained by attempting to classify s 7A itself as beneficial legislation. The question remains one of ordinary statutory construction by reference to text, context and purpose.
79 Another contextual aspect of the IR Act is pertinent.
80 Section 24A and s 81CAA were both inserted into the IR Act by the IRLA Act. They address the same subject matter as s 7A, that is, the classification of a person as an employee or independent contractor.
81 Section 24A concerns proceedings in the Commission and s 81CAA in similar terms concerns proceedings before the IMC. They say:
24A. Onus of proving individual is or was not employee
If, in proceedings before the Commission, a party claims an individual who carries or carried out work for the party is or was not an employee of the party, it is for the party to prove the individual is or was not the party’s employee.
…
81CAA. Onus of proving individual is or was not employee
If, in proceedings before an industrial magistrate’s court, a party claims an individual who carries or carried out work for the party is or was not an employee of the party, it is for the party to prove the individual is or was not the party’s employee.
82 Unlike s 7A, s 24A and s 81CAA are procedural, not substantive. Although the onus created by those sections operates prospectively, the repeated use of both present and past tense language demonstrates a clear intention that they apply to proceedings concerning historical work relationships, including relationships that had ended before the proceedings were commenced. Consequently, the provisions are capable of applying to disputes concerning pre-commencement working arrangements without giving the sections substantive retrospective operation.
83 Section 24A and s 81CAA demonstrate that Parliament specifically contemplated litigation concerning historical work relationships. It would be an unusual legislative choice to prescribe a new onus of proof for determining whether a person ‘is or was’ an employee while at the same time preserving an entirely different substantive test for those same historical relationships. Nothing in the text of the IR Act indicates Parliament intended such a bifurcated regime.
84 Section 7A should be construed to allow all three provisions to operate coherently and consistently. The respondent’s strictly prospective construction does not do this. The respondent’s construction produces fragmentation and practical incoherence. To work together in determining the status of a work relationship without anomaly, s 7A must be construed as operating on pre-commencement periods of the work relationship.
85 The respondent invites the Court to contrast the absence of transitional provisions for s 7A with the transitional provisions for s 15AA of the FWA, on which s 7A was modelled or which s 7A ‘reflects.’ The Explanatory Memorandum at [76] says ‘[c]lause 6 of the Bill inserts new sections 7A and 7B. Section 7A reflects new s 15AA of the FWA. (New section 15AA was inserted by item 237 of Schedule 1 to the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes No. 2) Act 2024)’ (emphasis added).
The transitional provisions of the FWA relevantly provide:
116 Relationships in existence as at commencement or entered into on or after commencement
(1) Subject to this Schedule and sections 15AB to 15AD of the amended Act, section 15AA of the amended Act applies on and after commencement to the following:
(a) a relationship between an individual and a person entered into before commencement that is in existence as at commencement;
(b) a relationship between an individual and a person entered into on or after commencement.
(2) Despite section 40A, section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, as in force from time to time, applies in relation to the amendment made by item 237 of Part 15 of Schedule 1 to the amending Act.
Note: Section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides for the effect of amendment and repeal of provisions of Acts, including in relation to rights, liabilities, penalties and forfeitures etc. accrued or incurred before the repeal.
117 References to employees etc. in fair work instruments made before commencement
(1) This clause applies to a fair work instrument that:
(a) was made before commencement; and
(b) is in operation on or after commencement.
(2) A reference in the fair work instrument to an employee or an employer is taken, on and after commencement, to include a reference to an employee or an employer, as the case requires, within the meaning of section 15AA of the amended Act, and, to avoid doubt, does not include a reference to an individual in respect of whom an opt out notice has been given and not revoked.
118 Entitlements determined by reference to length of a period of employment etc.
(1) This clause applies if:
(a) immediately before commencement, an individual was not an employee of a person within the ordinary meaning of that expression; and
(b) because of the operation of section 15AA of the amended Act, on commencement, the individual becomes an employee of the person, within the ordinary meaning of that expression, in respect of that relationship.
(2) For the purposes of determining whether the individual has a right or entitlement under the amended Act or under a fair work instrument in respect of the employment of the individual, being a right or entitlement calculated by reference to:
(a) the individual’s length of service (however described) as an employee; or
(b) a minimum period of employment (however described) of the individual;
the nature of the relationship between the individual and the person in respect of a period or periods before commencement is to be ascertained in accordance with the old Act.
86 The transitional provisions enacted in relation to s 15AA of the FWA are comparatively detailed and complex. They demonstrate that the Commonwealth Parliament turned its mind expressly to the temporal operation of the new statutory employee test and, to a limited extent, conferred retrospective operation upon it. In broad terms, s 15AA applies to work relationships entered into before commencement where the relationship remained on foot at commencement. However, where an individual would not have been an employee under the pre-existing law but is treated as an employee by operation of s 15AA, service performed before commencement is generally excluded from the calculation of statutory employment entitlements. Further, s 15AA does not apply to work relationships that ended before commencement. Nor does it have the effect of extending the coverage of industrial instruments to persons whose work relationships would not, before commencement, have been characterised as employment relationships.
87 The elaborate transitional regime accompanying s 15AA stands in contrast to the absence of any transitional provisions governing s 7A. I accept that, had Parliament intended that s 7A was to alter the legal characterisation of pre-commencement relationships, clear transitional provisions would have been expected. The absence of such provisions tends against a retrospective construction.
88 However, the significance of the absence of transitional provisions must be assessed in light of the statutory text actually enacted. A construction confining s 7A to post-commencement relationships would itself require significant qualifications to be read into the section. Parliament’s failure to enact transitional provisions may therefore indicate not that it intended the former law to continue to govern pre-existing relationships, but that it intended s 7A to operate according to its ordinary terms.
89 Overall, the statutory text and context is supportive of giving s 7A retrospective operation. The section should not be construed liberally in the way one would approach the construction of a beneficial or protective provision. However, the text itself is indicative of an intention towards a liberal approach.
90 Giving s 7A retrospective operation sits more harmoniously with other provisions of the IR Act that are directed at determining whether parties are in an employment relationship, giving greater coherence with the statutory scheme.
91 The respondent’s construction leads to an outcome that it is unlikely Parliament intended, that is, that different or multiple tests of whether a person is an employee apply at different points in time, with the anomalous outcomes that construction is likely to produce.
92 The respondent correctly observes that the absence of transitional provisions is ordinarily an indicator against retrospective operation. Standing alone, that consideration would favour the respondent's construction. However, it must be weighed against a number of countervailing matters. The text of s 7A draws no distinction between pre-commencement and post-commencement relationships; s 24A and s 81CAA expressly contemplate proceedings concerning historical work relationships; all three provisions were enacted together as part of a single legislative response to the High Court Decisions; and the respondent's construction would require the ongoing application of different employment-status tests to different periods of the same relationship. Considering those matters together, I am satisfied that a sufficiently clear intention for s 7A to apply whenever a working relationship’s status falls to be determined after its commencement, including where the relationship under examination pre-dated the commencement of s 7A is apparent, so as to displace the relatively weak presumption against retrospectivity.
Conclusion and disposition
93 For the above reasons, the answer to the question:
Does s 7A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) apply to the period of a relationship before s 7A commenced (being before 31 January 2025)?
is: Yes.




R. COSENTINO
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE



Luke Raymond Stewart -v- The State of Western Australia

INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

 

 

CITATION

:

2026 WAIRC 01020

 

 

 

CORAM

:

INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE R. COSENTINO

 

 

 

HEARD

:

ON THE PAPERS

 

 

 

DELIVERED

:

THURSDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 2026

 

 

 

FILE NO.

:

M 52 OF 2025

 

 

 

BETWEEN

:

Luke Raymond Stewart

 

 

CLAIMANT

 

 

 

 

 

AND

 

 

 

 

 

The State of Western Australia

 

 

RESPONDENT


CatchWords : INDUSTRIAL LAW (WA) – preliminary issue – determining whether individual is employee or person is employer – s 7A of Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) – whether s 7A applies to pre-commencement employment – statutory construction – rule or presumption against retrospectivity – no transitional provisions – held s 7A applies to pre-commencement employment

Legislation : Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA)

Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)

Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (WA)

Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)

Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA)

Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA)

Cases referred

to in reasons: : ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1

Amuta v Director-General, Department of Communities [2025] WAIRC 00881; (2025) 105 WAIG 2622

Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia [2012] HCA 19; (2012) 246 CLR 117

Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin [1978] UKPC 7; (1978) 18 ALR 385

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165

Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut [2002] NSWCA 18; (2002) 119 LGERA 171

Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261

Muller v Timbecon Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 42; (2023) 324 IR 132

Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] UKPC 37

Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77

Rodway v The Queen [1990] HCA 19; (1990) 169 CLR 515

Stephens v The Queen [2022] HCA 31; (2022) 273 CLR 635

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16

The Commissioner of Police v Ferguson [2019] WASCA 14; (2019) 54 WAR 177

The State of Western Australia v Williams [2022] WASCA 105; (2022) 300 A Crim R 515

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456

Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2008] WASCA 188; (2008) 38 WAR 217

ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2; (2022) 275 CLR 254

Result : Preliminary issue determined

Representation:

Claimant : Self-represented

Respondent : Ms E. Negus (of counsel)

 



REASONS FOR DECISION

1         The claimant, Mr Luke Stewart, claims that the respondent, through the Director General, Department of Water and Environmental Regulation, contravened s 97D(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) by representing that he was an independent contractor, and not an employee.

2         Section 97D(1) says:

An employer must not represent to an employee that a contract of employment is a contract for services.

3         The claimant’s Substituted Grounds for his claim are lengthy, particularising the formation of a Written Contract for Services between him and the Department on 18 July 2024 and nine variations to the Written Contract for Services between 18 July 2024 and September 2024. The representations which the claimant says contravened s 97D(1) are alleged to have been made ‘From 18 July 2024 onwards’ and include representations allegedly made on 11 January 2025 and 15 January 2025.[i]

4         Fundamental to the claim is that the claimant was at law an employee and not an independent contractor when he performed work for the Department after 18 July 2024. If he is properly categorised as an independent contractor, there can be no misrepresentation or contravention of s 97D(1) by virtue of a representation that he was an independent contractor. The claim therefore calls for the application of a test for whether he was an employee or an independent contractor.

5         The claimant performed work for the Department under the Written Contract for Services from June 2024 to the end of December 2024.

6         On 31 January 2025, the IR Act was amended to insert s 7A which says:

Determining whether individual is employee or person is employer

(1)      This section applies for determining, for the purposes of this Act, the LSL Act or the MCE Act —

(a)      whether an individual is an employee of a person; or

(b)      whether a person is an employer of an individual.

(2)      The matter is determined by ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person.

(3)      For the purposes of subsection (2), consideration must be given to the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person, including —

(a)      the terms of the contract governing the relationship; and

(b)      other factors relevant to the totality of the relationship, including how the contract is performed in practice.

Note for this section:

This section was enacted as a response to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2.

7         Before s 7A was enacted, the common law as to whether a relationship was one of employment or of principal and contractor was articulated by the High Court’s decisions in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165 (Personnel Contracting) and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2; (2022) 275 CLR 254. I will refer to these together as the High Court Decisions.

8         It is accepted that s 7A had the effect of modifying the common law test articulated in the High Court Decisions.

9         The respondent maintains that the s 7A test does not apply, but rather the common law test applies because the claim relates to an engagement that existed, and work that was performed, before 31 January 2025. That is, before s 7A was enacted.

10      Mr Stewart claims the test for whether he was an employee is the test in s 7A.

11      On the respondent’s application, on 3 August 2026 I ordered that the question of whether s 7A applied to the claimant’s engagement be determined as a preliminary issue on the papers pursuant to reg 7(1)(i) of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA).

12      The particular question these reasons answer is ‘Does s 7A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) apply to the period of a relationship before s 7A commenced (being before 31 January 2025)?’ The answer to this question lies in the correct construction of s 7A.

Relevant Principles

13      The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The applicable principles are well-known. A conventional statement of the approach was given by Buss J in the Industrial Appeal Court decision of The Commissioner of Police v Ferguson [2019] WASCA 14; (2019) 54 WAR 177 at [70] ‑ [73]:

In Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ observed:

‘This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text’ (Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]; [2009] HCA 41). So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself [39].

See also Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Thiess v Collector of Customs.

The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The statutory text is the surest guide to Parliament's intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the existing state of the law, the history of the legislative scheme and the general purpose and policy of the provision (in particular, the mischief it is seeking to remedy). See CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue.

The purpose of legislation must be derived from the statutory text and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions. See Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross. The intended reach of a legislative provision is to be discerned from the words of the provision and not by making an a priori assumption about its purpose. See Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd.

As Crennan J noted in Northern Territory v Collins, ‘[s]econdary material seeking to explain the words of a statute cannot displace the clear meaning of the text of a provision (Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 228 CLR 529 at 538 [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 11), not least because such material may confuse what was “intended … with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed” (Hilder v Dexter [1902] AC 474 at 477 per Earl of Halsbury LC)’. That statement of principle applies to extrinsic evidence admissible at common law and also to extrinsic evidence admissible under s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). In other words, the statutory text, and not non‑statutory language seeking to explain the statutory text, is paramount. See Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd. (footnotes omitted)

14      At common law, there is a rule or principle of construction, commonly referred to as a presumption against giving a statute retrospective operation. This principle was described by the Court of Appeal in Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77 (Lawrence) at [95] ‑ [100]:

There is no doubt that the Parliament of Western Australia has the capacity to pass legislation with retrospective effect. It is said, however, that: ‘[r]etrospective legislation is somewhat 'distasteful' - even more so when retrospective legislation takes away accrued rights’. The resistance of the law to retrospectivity in legislation is to be found in the rule - often expressed in terms of being a ‘presumption’ - that, save where the legislature makes its intention clear, a statute ought not to be given retrospective operation where to do so would be to attach new legal consequences to facts or events which occurred before its commencement.

In terms of stating the relevant principle, the general common law rule as stated by Dixon CJ in Maxwell v Murphy is one that is often referred to:

[A] statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.

So too is the following statement of Fullagar J in Fisher v Hebburn:

There can be no doubt that the general rule is that an amending enactment - or, for that matter, any enactment - is prima facie to be construed as having a prospective operation only. That is to say, it is prima facie to be construed as not attaching new legal consequences to facts, or events which occurred before its commencement.

While often referred to as a ‘presumption’, the principle is, we consider, better understood as a rule of statutory construction. As was said by French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia, in the context of discussing the principle, in the end the court must construe statutes by reference to their text, context and purpose. The rule of construction fits within, not outside of, the general approach to statutory construction; it is not controlling but is part of the process of construction to be undertaken by the court. Accordingly, if the rule ought to be considered when construing s 32(1) of the Supreme Court Act [1938 (WA)], the starting point in construing s 32(1) remains the text of the statutory provision which must be read and understood in its context and by giving effect to the apparent legislative purpose.

The presumptive rule of construction is rooted in fairness and the principle of legality. It is founded on a presumption of common sense that in a well-ordered and civilized society the legislature would not intend what is unjust. To again refer to the reasons of French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Australian Education Union:

In a representative democracy governed by the rule of law, it can be assumed that clear language will be used by the Parliament in enacting a statute which falsifies, retroactively, existing legal rules upon which people have ordered their affairs, exercised their rights and incurred liabilities and obligations.

The rule does not apply to a provision that is merely procedural in the narrow sense, ie a provision that would not, if given unconfined operation, affect pre-existing substantive rights or liabilities. Often such statutory provisions only operate prospectively - prescribing how something may or must be done in the future even if what is to be done relates to or is based on past events - and there is no room for the operation of the presumption. It is accepted, however, that:

the difference between substantive law and procedure is often difficult to draw and statutes which are commonly classified as procedural - statutes of limitation, for example - may operate in such a way as to affect existing rights or obligations. When they operate in that way they are not merely procedural and they fall within the presumption against retrospective operation.

(footnotes omitted)

15      The rule does not apply to cases where the provision under consideration merely takes account of antecedent facts and circumstances as a basis for what it prescribes for the future and does no more than that. As French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ stated in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia [2012] HCA 19; (2012) 246 CLR 117 (Australian Education Union) at [26], ‘interference with existing rights does not make a statute retrospective.’

16      The concept of rights and liabilities for the purpose of the presumptive rule is not narrow, and may encompass entitlements that fall short of enforceable legal rights, inchoate rights, obligations and liabilities.[ii] However, a mere hope or expectation that a right will be created does not attract the presumption.[iii]

17      The Court of Appeal in Lawrence described the presumptive rule as ‘rooted in fairness and the principle of legality.’ The High Court in Stephens v The Queen [2022] HCA 31; (2022) 273 CLR 635 (Stephens) identified ‘reasonable expectations’ as underlying fairness:

[T]he reason for regarding retrospective law-making as unjust is that it disappoints the justified expectations of those who, in acting, have relied on the assumption that the legal consequences of their acts will be determined by the known state of the law established at the time of their acts.[iv]

18      The force of the rule therefore depends on the circumstances; the less a provision would defeat reasonable expectations, and the less injustice it will cause, the less force will be in the presumption against retrospective operation.[v] Consequently, the resistance of the common law to construing statutes as taking effect before their enactment is graduated, according to the extent of their propounded effect.[vi] So, in Lawrence at [113], the Court of Appeal said: ‘where a retrospective operation might be considered to work some injustice to one party, but is clearly required to rectify a manifest injustice to others, there is, in principle, little reason to give much weight to the presumption.’

19      The rule will not preclude a provision from having a retrospective operation if the legislature’s intention for it to operate retrospectively appears with reasonable certainty from the text and context of the provision in question.[vii]

Respondent’s Submissions

20      The respondent contends that s 7A does not apply to periods of a working relationship that pre‑date its commencement on 31 January 2025. The respondent submits that any application of s 7A to an earlier period would constitute a retrospective operation of the legislation and therefore engage the established presumption against retrospectivity.

21      The respondent acknowledges that, viewed superficially, s 7A might appear to operate only prospectively because it directs the Industrial Magistrates Court (IMC) and the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission on how to determine an individual’s employment status after the provision commenced. However, the respondent argues that this characterisation overlooks the practical effect of the provision. If applied to relationships existing before 31 January 2025, then s 7A would alter the legal consequences of past events and therefore have a retrospective effect in substance.

22      The respondent submits that, if s 7A were applied to pre-commencement periods, a relationship that was not legally characterised as one of employment under the High Court Decisions could subsequently be found to be an employment relationship under the new statutory test. Such an outcome would alter rights and liabilities that had already accrued under the law as it stood at the relevant time, and therefore falls squarely within the kind of retrospective operation described in authorities concerning retrospectivity.

23      The respondent emphasises that, immediately prior to the enactment of s 7A, parties had organised their affairs on the basis of their contracts, the applicable statutes and the prevailing common law. Their rights and obligations had crystallised through the performance of work and other past events. According to the respondent, applying s 7A to those past periods would retrospectively re-characterise those relationships and thereby modify established legal rights and obligations.

24      Particular emphasis is placed on the practical consequences for persons subsequently found to be employers. The respondent argues that retrospective application could expose such parties to liability for breaches of employment obligations, including leave entitlements, record-keeping requirements, underpayment claims and civil penalties, despite those obligations not applying to them when the relevant conduct occurred. It is submitted that preventing precisely this type of unfair outcome is the purpose of the presumption against retrospectivity.

25      The respondent also relies on the ‘reasonable expectations’ analysis discussed by the High Court in Stephens and the rationale for the presumption explained in Australian Education Union. It is argued that contracting parties reasonably expect their rights, liabilities and the fundamental character of their contractual relationship to be determined according to the law in force when the contract was made and performed. The High Court Decisions are said to have been legal rules upon which parties arranged their affairs, and clear statutory language would therefore be required before Parliament could be taken to have displaced those expectations.

26      Finally, the respondent contends that no such clear indication appears in s 7A or elsewhere in the legislation. The provision is said to be silent on temporal operation and contains nothing comparable to the express retrospective wording considered in Australian Education Union (being ‘taken ... to have always been valid’). The respondent further notes that s 7A was modelled on s 15AA of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA), while pointing out that the Commonwealth legislation expressly only applies prospectively. These matters are relied upon to submit that the presumption against retrospectivity has not been displaced and that s 7A applies only from 31 January 2025 onwards.

Claimant’s Submissions

27      The claimant submits that the IR Act is beneficial and remedial legislation and as such, should be construed liberally, rather than literally or technically.

28      The claimant relies on various extrinsic materials to identify the mischief addressed by the legislation and Parliament’s intended operation of s 7A.

29      According to the claimant, the parliamentary debates demonstrate that Parliament regarded the High Court Decisions as having disrupted the established approach to distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Statements by the Hon Matthew Swinbourn, Parliamentary Secretary, described the legislative purpose as restoring the pre-2022 position and ‘return[ing] it back to what it was’, rather than creating new rights or forms of employment.[viii]

30      The claimant emphasises that Parliament repeatedly described s 7A as restoring a methodology that requires consideration of the totality of the relationship, including both contractual terms and the manner in which the relationship was performed in practice. Parliamentary debate highlighted concerns that written contracts may not always reflect the practical reality of working arrangements and that courts should look beyond contractual labels where necessary.

31      Particular reliance is placed upon parliamentary discussions of historical employment claims. The claimant notes that the Parliamentary Secretary expressly contemplated circumstances where a worker, after a relationship spanning 20 years had ended, might commence proceedings seeking annual leave or long service leave on the basis that the relationship had been one of employment. The claimant argues that the speech assumes that the effect of inserting s 7A would be to enable the courts to determine the character of such long-standing historical relationships under the s 7A methodology.

32      The claimant submits that Parliament’s response to concerns about historical claims is especially significant. Rather than stating that pre-commencement relationships would remain governed by the approach of the High Court Decisions, Parliament responded by explaining that claims by genuinely independent contractors would not succeed merely by the introduction of s 7A. Again, this explanation would be unnecessary if s 7A only operated prospectively.

33      The claimant accepts the orthodox presumption against legislation retrospectively affecting accrued rights and liabilities but argues that the relevant authorities, including Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261, The State of Western Australia v Williams [2022] WASCA 105; (2022) 300 A Crim R 515, Rodway v The Queen [1990] HCA 19; (1990) 169 CLR 515 and Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2008] WASCA 188; (2008) 38 WAR 217, distinguishes between legislation that alters existing rights, and legislation that takes account of antecedent facts when making a later determination. The claimant submits that s 7A falls into the latter category because it prescribes the considerations relevant to determining status and does not itself alter contracts, work previously performed, remuneration paid, or historical conduct.

34      The claimant further argues that the respondent has failed to identify any accrued right to have an individual’s employment status determined under the High Court Decisions methodology. Reliance is placed on ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1 as an example of legislation affecting a clearly accrued statutory entitlement, contrasted with s 7A, which is said only to govern how courts characterise an existing relationship.

35      In this regard, the claimant’s submissions rely upon Muller v Timbecon Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 42; (2023) 324 IR 132 as demonstrating that parties do not possess an accrued right to have their status assessed according to the methodology that existed when the relationship was formed or performed. In that case, the employment status was determined according to the High Court Decisions even though the relationship had largely occurred before the High Court Decisions were delivered.

36      The claimant submits that the respondent’s construction creates substantial practical difficulties for relationships that span a period before and after 31 January 2025. If the respondent’s construction is correct, either the old methodology would continue indefinitely for pre-existing relationships, or an otherwise unchanged relationship would need to be divided into separate periods governed by different tests. The claimant contends that neither outcome is reflected in the text of s 7A and both create artificial complexity, particularly in relation to long service leave claims.

37      The claimant points to s 97D of the IR Act as relevant context for the construction task. The claimant notes that the prohibition in s 97D on misrepresenting an employment relationship commenced in June 2022, whereas s 7A commenced in January 2025. He argues that s 7A did not create the distinction between employee and contractor or the prohibition itself, but merely altered the methodology used to determine into which category a worker falls.

38      The claimant contends that Parliament could have enacted transitional provisions in relation to the operation of s 7A, but it did not. He notes that the Commonwealth Parliament regulated the temporal operation of s 15AA of the FWA when it was enacted, by way of transitional provisions. He also notes that s 119 and s 123 of the IR Act, inserted by the Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (WA) (IRLA Act), are transitional provisions that expressly preserve the former law for certain categories of ‘pre-commencement behaviour’ including bullying and sexual harassment matters. The claimant argues that these sections demonstrate that Parliament knew how to preserve previous law when it intended to do so.

39      The absence of any equivalent transitional provision for employment characterisation under s 7A is said to be significant context. However, the claimant accepts it does not displace the presumption against retrospective operation.

40      In summary, the claimant submits that the application of s 7A to determinations made after its commencement is not retrospective, invoking the presumption, because the section regulates the process of determining an individual’s status rather than altering accrued rights or liabilities. Alternatively, if the presumption is engaged, the claimant submits that the text, context, purpose, legislative history and parliamentary materials disclose a sufficiently clear contrary intention to displace the presumption against retrospectivity.

41      The claimant contends that Parliament enacted s 7A specifically to displace the High Court Decisions’ methodology, and there is no textual or contextual basis for preserving that methodology indefinitely for historical working relationships.

The Effect of s 7A on the Common Law Position

42      Before grappling with the question of whether the construction of s 7A that the claimant contends for is retrospective, it is useful to recap the effect of s 7A on the common law position. What change in the law does s 7A effect? How does s 7A operate?

43      The reasons of Keifel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ (the plurality) in the Personnel Contracting articulate the common law principles that had developed concerning the identification of an employment relationship. The plurality did not purport to effect a change to the common law test by which the totality of the relationship between the parties must be assessed, nor to depart from the multifactorial test in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16.[ix] The plurality affirmed that where parties have comprehensively committed the term of their relationship to a written contract the validity of which is not in dispute, the characterisation of the relationship proceeds by reference to the rights and obligations under the contract: [59]. They went on to say at [61]:

The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that it is not appropriate, in the characterisation of a relationship as one of employment or of principal and independent contractor, to consider the ‘totality of the relationship between the parties’ by reference to the various indicia of employment that have been identified in the authorities. (footnotes omitted)

44      The plurality criticised the manner in which the multifactorial test was applied, describing the manner of application as ‘problematic’.[x] The concern was that the test had come to be applied as a ‘mechanistic counting of ticks’,[xi] treating the test as superseding or rejecting the authoritative settled law in Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin [1978] UKPC 7; (1978) 18 ALR 385 and Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] UKPC 37.[xii]

45      The High Court Decisions are said to represent a shift in how courts in Australia had traditionally approached the question of employment status by applying a multifactorial test extending to post contractual performance of the contract.[xiii] It is difficult to know the extent to which the shift would result in different outcomes in practical reality. In Personnel Contracting, Gageler and Gleeson JJ approached the question of employment status in accordance with the traditional multifactorial approach looking at the totality of the relationship and arrived at the same conclusion as the plurality. That is, both approaches resulted in a finding that the worker was the respondent’s employee.

46      The plurality’s reasons leave scope for the consideration of the parties’ subsequent conduct as relevant in a variety of scenarios, including:

(a)     where the contract is not wholly in writing but is wholly or partly oral, so that subsequent conduct may aid the construction of the contract’s terms;

(b)     where the written contract has been varied, discharged or replaced by a new oral contract;

(c)     where the written contract was a sham from the outset because it did not reflect the true agreement between the parties; and

(d)     where the conduct of the relationship might lead to a party being estopped from relying on the terms of the contract.[xiv]

47      It is uncontentious that s 7A was enacted ‘as a response to’ the High Court Decisions. As much is stated in the note published following s 7A.

48      Like s 15AA of the FWA, which commenced operation on 26 August 2024, the effect of s 7A is to essentially override a single aspect of the precedent established by the High Court Decisions. Section 7A mandates consideration of how the contract is or was performed in practice, when determining if an individual was an employee, as well as to the terms of the contract.

49      Section 7A requires consideration of matters which, in at least some cases, would not be considered under the approach advocated by the plurality in the High Court Decisions.

50      In many cases, including those described in [46] above, or where there is no substantive difference between the obligations established by the contract, and the way the contract is carried out in practice, there might be no difference between a s 7A approach and the common law approach. It is only when there is a divergence between the obligations established by the contractual terms, and the performance of the contract in practice, that the operation of s 7A will lead to a different legal conclusion as to the status of a relationship as one of employment or of principal and independent contractor.

Does the Rule/Presumption Against Retrospectivity Arise?

51      The claimant’s primary submission is that the application of s 7A to a pre‑31 January 2025 relationship is not retrospective.

52      The claimant accepts that the application of s 7A to a working relationship that existed before 31 January 2025, may produce a different conclusion as to employment status, compared to if s 7A was not applied. It follows that substantive rights and liabilities may consequently be found to have existed, which would not otherwise have been found to exist.[xv]

53      The claimant argues, however, that employment status, and its associated rights and liabilities, should not be regarded as a matter which is ‘fixed’ at an earlier point in time. Further, he says that as these are not fixed matters, they are not caught by the presumption, relying on Dixon J’s formulation of the rule in Maxwell v Murphy.

54      Dixon J’s statement of the rule in Maxwell v Murphy is at 267:

The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events. But, given rights and liabilities fixed by reference to past facts, matters or events, the law appointing or regulating the manner in which they are to be enforced or their enjoyment is to be secured by judicial remedy is within the application of such a presumption.

55      Dixon J does not articulate the general rule by reference to ‘fixed’ rights and liabilities. His Honour states that the general rule applies on ‘rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.’ His Honour uses the word ‘fixed’ when articulating the exception to the rule, not the rule itself. In this context, the claimant places more weight on the word ‘fixed’ than the passage can bear.

56      In Amuta v Director-General, Department of Communities [2025] WAIRC 00881; (2025) 105 WAIG 2622 (Amuta), Commissioner Tsang was required to consider whether s 7B of the IR Act applied to periods of employment that pre‑dated the section’s commencement. Section 7B, like s 7A, was inserted with effect from 31 January 2025. It contains criteria for determining whether an employee is a casual employee. A note to the section indicates it was enacted as a response to the High Court decision of WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23; (2021) 271 CLR 456.

57      Commissioner Tsang construed s 7B as not applying retrospectively on the basis that it applies only to post‑31 January 2025 claims, although it must be applied to pre‑31 January 2025 periods of employment relevant to such claims.[xvi] Strictly speaking, the construction the Commissioner gave to s 7B is that it operates retrospectively but not retroactively. In other words, it operated retrospectively in the broad sense. The Commissioner was compelled to this conclusion by the need to give full effect to the text of s 7B which requires consideration of the totality of the employment relationship. The effect of the Commissioner’s reasoning is that the presumption against any retrospective operation was displaced by the text of s 7B itself.

58      In my view, applying s 7A to a pre-commencement period would attach legal significance to antecedent facts and may alter the rights and responsibilities arising from those facts. The presumption against retrospectivity is therefore engaged.

59      The respondent submits that the strength of the presumption is ‘at least moderately strong’ because if s 7A were to apply retrospectively, it would significantly affect pre-existing rights and liabilities of the parties, including by giving rise to civil penalty contraventions on the employer.

60      I disagree. In my view the presumption is weak. This is for three reasons.

61      First, in cases lying near the boundary between employment and independent contracting, characterisation of the true legal status of the parties’ relationship is not self-evident under the common law test. The correct characterisation is a mixed question of fact and law requiring an evaluative assessment. There may be genuine contestability as to the proper conclusion unless and until the issue is determined by a court or tribunal.

62      The existence of reasonable expectations does not depend upon certainty of outcome. However, where the legal characterisation of a relationship is evaluative and contestable, the extent to which those expectations are undermined by legislative change may be less significant than where legislation alters fixed proprietary or vested rights. Put another way, the contestable nature of the enquiry diminishes the strength of any expectation that the relationship will be characterised in a particular way.

63      Second, as I discussed at [45] ‑ [50] above, the test for employment status under s 7A and the test at common law have significant features in common. The multifactorial analysis is relevant under both tests, and there are a variety of circumstances where post-contractual conduct will be relevant for the purposes of the common law test. There is a relatively narrow area where s 7A would operate to create new obligations or liabilities where they would not otherwise exist.

64      Finally, where contractual relationships were entered into before the High Court Decisions were delivered, there could be no reasonable expectations based on the principles that emerged from them.

65      In this context, while the presumption against retrospectivity applies, it is a weak presumption that can be displaced with relative ease. The real question is whether the text, context and purpose of s 7A demonstrate a sufficiently clear legislative intention to displace the weak presumption.

Is the Presumption Displaced by a Clear Legislative Intent?

Section 7A’s Text

66      I start with the text of the section itself. Section 7A is expressed in the present tense. By s 8 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), whenever a matter is expressed in the present tense, it is applied to the circumstances as they arise to give effect to the law according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.

67      Nothing in the text of s 7A expressly confines its operation to relationships entered into after 31 January 2025. Nor does the text distinguish between ongoing and completed relationships.

68      The plain, natural, straightforward meaning of s 7A is that it applies when presently assessing a relationship, regardless of when the relationship commenced and regardless of when the relationship subsisted.

69      On the other hand, a reading of s 7A which precludes its application to a period of employment prior to 31 January 2025 is strained, and not apparent on the face of the text.

70      At its core, s 7A calls for consideration of the ‘practical realities’ and ‘totality’ of a relationship. These words are flexible expressions, directing the focus to the way things actually operate and the substance of a relationship as opposed to narrow, technical, or formal aspects. This feature of the text also points towards a broad and encompassing temporal application. It is somewhat inconsistent with the text to require a compartmentalised analysis of an employment relationship, with different legal tests being applied at different times.

The Statutory Context

71      I now turn to the statutory context. Section 7A of the IR Act is not an operative provision. It forms part of Part I – Introductory, and follows s 7 which contains definitions of terms used in the IR Act.

72      Because it is not an operative provision, it is always read together with other provisions of the IR Act as well as the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) (MCE Act) and the Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA) (LSL Act). Most importantly, it is always read together with the definition of ‘employee’ in s 7 and often with the definition of ‘employer’ in s 7. Those definitions are:

employee means –

(a)      an individual who is employed by an employer to do work for hire or reward, including as an apprentice; or

(b)      an individual whose usual status is that of an employee;

Note for this definition:

See section 7A which applies for the purposes of determining whether an individual is an employee of a person.

employer means –

(a)      a person or public authority employing 1 or more employees; or

(aa) in relation to an industrial matter mentioned in section 36AA — the employing authority of a public service officer or health services employee; or

(b)      except as provided in the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Commonwealth) section 12, a foreign state or consulate employing 1 or more employees; or

(c)      a labour hire agency or group training organisation that arranges for an employee (being a person who is a party to a contract of service with the agency or organisation) to do work for another person, even though the employee is working for the other person under an arrangement between the agency or organisation and the other person;

Note for this definition:

See section 7A which applies for the purposes of determining whether a person is an employer of an individual.

73      Pearce’s Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th ed) at [10.29] contains the following extract from Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut:

[I]t must always be remembered that any amendment to the definition section of an Act or Statutory Instrument, actually amends each section of the Act or clause of the instrument where the relevant word or expression is employed. Such an amendment thus, unless plainly indicated, is almost always construed as operating prospectively only. (emphasis added)[xvii]

74      Construing s 7A requires consideration of its intended effect when read together with the definitions of employee and employer in s 7 and all and any of the provisions of the IR Act, the LSL Act and the MCE Act which invoke those definitions. These are numerous. The existence of a relationship between an employee and an employer is key to the vast bulk of the operation of the IR Act, the LSL Act and the MCE Act.

75      The application of s 7A includes:

(a)     determining whether a person is entitled to long service leave under the LSL Act, and determining the period of continuous service for accrual of long service leave.

(b)     determining whether a person is entitled to statutory minimum rates of pay; personal leave; annual leave; bereavement leave; family and domestic violence leave; the ability to request flexible working arrangements; notice of termination; and other minimum conditions of employment provided for by the MCE Act.[xviii]

(c)     determining whether a matter is an industrial matter over which the Commission has jurisdiction.[xix]

(d)     determining whether a person is an employer and therefore able to be party to an industrial agreement or is bound by an award.[xx]

76      The claimant says that the IR Act is beneficial and remedial legislation and so it should be construed liberally. The LSL Act and the MCE Act are beneficial and protective. Particular parts of the IR Act, such as s 23A providing remedies for unfair dismissal; Part 2 Division 3AA which includes stop bullying and sexual harassment provisions, and Part 6B – Protection of Employee Rights, can also be described as protective, beneficial or remedial. But I do not consider that the IR Act as a whole can be characterised as beneficial, remedial or protective. Rather, the IR Act has many functions, purposes and objects. The short title of the IR Act describes it as an Act to:

[C]onsolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention and resolution of conflict in respect of industrial matters, the mutual rights and duties of employers and employees, their rights and duties of organisation of employers and employees, and for related purposes.

77      Reference to the IR Act’s objects in s 6 and the list in s 26 of considerations which the Commission must have regard to in determining industrial matters is sufficient to demonstrate that the IR Act is not only beneficial legislation. Accordingly, it would be erroneous to treat the introductory provisions, including s 7A, as ‘beneficial’ and so calling for a liberal interpretation.

78      Although some provisions of the IR Act, the MCE Act and the LSL Act have a beneficial or protective character, little assistance is gained by attempting to classify s 7A itself as beneficial legislation. The question remains one of ordinary statutory construction by reference to text, context and purpose.

79      Another contextual aspect of the IR Act is pertinent.

80      Section 24A and s 81CAA were both inserted into the IR Act by the IRLA Act. They address the same subject matter as s 7A, that is, the classification of a person as an employee or independent contractor.

81      Section 24A concerns proceedings in the Commission and s 81CAA in similar terms concerns proceedings before the IMC. They say:

24A. Onus of proving individual is or was not employee

If, in proceedings before the Commission, a party claims an individual who carries or carried out work for the party is or was not an employee of the party, it is for the party to prove the individual is or was not the party’s employee.

…

81CAA. Onus of proving individual is or was not employee

If, in proceedings before an industrial magistrate’s court, a party claims an individual who carries or carried out work for the party is or was not an employee of the party, it is for the party to prove the individual is or was not the party’s employee.

82      Unlike s 7A, s 24A and s 81CAA are procedural, not substantive. Although the onus created by those sections operates prospectively, the repeated use of both present and past tense language demonstrates a clear intention that they apply to proceedings concerning historical work relationships, including relationships that had ended before the proceedings were commenced. Consequently, the provisions are capable of applying to disputes concerning pre-commencement working arrangements without giving the sections substantive retrospective operation.

83      Section 24A and s 81CAA demonstrate that Parliament specifically contemplated litigation concerning historical work relationships. It would be an unusual legislative choice to prescribe a new onus of proof for determining whether a person ‘is or was’ an employee while at the same time preserving an entirely different substantive test for those same historical relationships. Nothing in the text of the IR Act indicates Parliament intended such a bifurcated regime.

84      Section 7A should be construed to allow all three provisions to operate coherently and consistently. The respondent’s strictly prospective construction does not do this. The respondent’s construction produces fragmentation and practical incoherence. To work together in determining the status of a work relationship without anomaly, s 7A must be construed as operating on pre-commencement periods of the work relationship.

85      The respondent invites the Court to contrast the absence of transitional provisions for s 7A with the transitional provisions for s 15AA of the FWA, on which s 7A was modelled or which s 7A ‘reflects.’[xxi] The transitional provisions of the FWA relevantly provide:

116 Relationships in existence as at commencement or entered into on or after commencement

(1)      Subject to this Schedule and sections 15AB to 15AD of the amended Act, section 15AA of the amended Act applies on and after commencement to the following:

(a)      a relationship between an individual and a person entered into before commencement that is in existence as at commencement;

(b)      a relationship between an individual and a person entered into on or after commencement.

(2)      Despite section 40A, section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, as in force from time to time, applies in relation to the amendment made by item 237 of Part 15 of Schedule 1 to the amending Act.

Note: Section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides for the effect of amendment and repeal of provisions of Acts, including in relation to rights, liabilities, penalties and forfeitures etc. accrued or incurred before the repeal.

117 References to employees etc. in fair work instruments made before commencement

(1)      This clause applies to a fair work instrument that:

(a)      was made before commencement; and

(b)      is in operation on or after commencement.

(2)      A reference in the fair work instrument to an employee or an employer is taken, on and after commencement, to include a reference to an employee or an employer, as the case requires, within the meaning of section 15AA of the amended Act, and, to avoid doubt, does not include a reference to an individual in respect of whom an opt out notice has been given and not revoked.

118 Entitlements determined by reference to length of a period of employment etc.

(1)      This clause applies if:

(a)      immediately before commencement, an individual was not an employee of a person within the ordinary meaning of that expression; and

(b)      because of the operation of section 15AA of the amended Act, on commencement, the individual becomes an employee of the person, within the ordinary meaning of that expression, in respect of that relationship.

(2)      For the purposes of determining whether the individual has a right or entitlement under the amended Act or under a fair work instrument in respect of the employment of the individual, being a right or entitlement calculated by reference to:

(a)      the individual’s length of service (however described) as an employee; or

(b)      a minimum period of employment (however described) of the individual;

the nature of the relationship between the individual and the person in respect of a period or periods before commencement is to be ascertained in accordance with the old Act.

86      The transitional provisions enacted in relation to s 15AA of the FWA are comparatively detailed and complex. They demonstrate that the Commonwealth Parliament turned its mind expressly to the temporal operation of the new statutory employee test and, to a limited extent, conferred retrospective operation upon it. In broad terms, s 15AA applies to work relationships entered into before commencement where the relationship remained on foot at commencement. However, where an individual would not have been an employee under the pre-existing law but is treated as an employee by operation of s 15AA, service performed before commencement is generally excluded from the calculation of statutory employment entitlements. Further, s 15AA does not apply to work relationships that ended before commencement. Nor does it have the effect of extending the coverage of industrial instruments to persons whose work relationships would not, before commencement, have been characterised as employment relationships.

87      The elaborate transitional regime accompanying s 15AA stands in contrast to the absence of any transitional provisions governing s 7A. I accept that, had Parliament intended that s 7A was to alter the legal characterisation of pre-commencement relationships, clear transitional provisions would have been expected. The absence of such provisions tends against a retrospective construction.

88      However, the significance of the absence of transitional provisions must be assessed in light of the statutory text actually enacted. A construction confining s 7A to post-commencement relationships would itself require significant qualifications to be read into the section. Parliament’s failure to enact transitional provisions may therefore indicate not that it intended the former law to continue to govern pre-existing relationships, but that it intended s 7A to operate according to its ordinary terms.

89      Overall, the statutory text and context is supportive of giving s 7A retrospective operation. The section should not be construed liberally in the way one would approach the construction of a beneficial or protective provision. However, the text itself is indicative of an intention towards a liberal approach.

90      Giving s 7A retrospective operation sits more harmoniously with other provisions of the IR Act that are directed at determining whether parties are in an employment relationship, giving greater coherence with the statutory scheme.

91      The respondent’s construction leads to an outcome that it is unlikely Parliament intended, that is, that different or multiple tests of whether a person is an employee apply at different points in time, with the anomalous outcomes that construction is likely to produce.

92      The respondent correctly observes that the absence of transitional provisions is ordinarily an indicator against retrospective operation. Standing alone, that consideration would favour the respondent's construction. However, it must be weighed against a number of countervailing matters. The text of s 7A draws no distinction between pre-commencement and post-commencement relationships; s 24A and s 81CAA expressly contemplate proceedings concerning historical work relationships; all three provisions were enacted together as part of a single legislative response to the High Court Decisions; and the respondent's construction would require the ongoing application of different employment-status tests to different periods of the same relationship. Considering those matters together, I am satisfied that a sufficiently clear intention for s 7A to apply whenever a working relationship’s status falls to be determined after its commencement, including where the relationship under examination pre-dated the commencement of s 7A is apparent, so as to displace the relatively weak presumption against retrospectivity.

Conclusion and disposition

93      For the above reasons, the answer to the question:

Does s 7A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) apply to the period of a relationship before s 7A commenced (being before 31 January 2025)?

is: Yes.

 

 

 

 

R. COSENTINO

INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE