This decision concerns the operation of the new public holiday provisions in s 30 of the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) (MCE Act), which commenced on 31 January 2025 and were modelled on s 114 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). In particular, the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) was required to consider what constitutes a valid “request” to work on a public holiday and how the reasonableness of such a request is to be assessed, having regard to the Full Federal Court’s decision in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v OS MCAP Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 51; (2023) 297 FCR 323 (OS MCAP).

The claimant, a sworn police officer employed in a non-operational role, alleged that the Police Commissioner contravened s 30 of the MCE Act by requiring him to work on the Labour Day public holiday on 3 March 2025.  The claimant commenced proceedings under s 83(1)(e)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) and also sought orders preventing further contraventions of the MCE Act and the imposition of pecuniary penalties, including on the basis that the alleged contravention was a serious contravention.

The claimant had been rostered to work on 3 March 2025, pursuant to a roster published before the new public holiday provisions commenced. Following the legislative amendments, WA Police issued broadcasts explaining the new provisions and establishing a process for employees to request not to work on a specific public holiday. The claimant, through his application, requested not to work because his role did not involve critical duties and because he was required to care for his three children, who would not be at school due to the public holiday. The application was ultimately refused by his supervisor.

The claimant argued that no valid request to work had been made within the meaning of s 30 of the MCE Act. Alternatively, he contended that any request was not reasonable because his duties were office-based, did not involve frontline policing and were not essential to community safety on the day in question.

The Commissioner of Police denied the claim, arguing that the roster, internal broadcasts and discussions between the claimant and his supervisor constituted a request to work within the meaning of the MCE Act.

Applying the principles in OS MCAP, the Court held that a request must leave room for discussion or negotiation and provide the employee with an opportunity to refuse. The Court found that this requirement had been satisfied. It concluded that the broadcasts, discussions with the supervisor and the formal application process through which employees could seek not to work on a public holiday provided the opportunity for consideration and refusal contemplated by s 30 of the MCE Act and accordingly, the claimant had not merely been directed to work.

The Court also found that the request was reasonable. Significant weight was placed on the nature of WA Police as an essential emergency service operating on a 24-hour basis. The Court accepted that sworn officers, including those employed in non-operational roles, remained operational police officers who could be redeployed at short notice if required. It held that the Commissioner was entitled to maintain sufficient operational capacity on public holidays to respond to emergencies and unforeseen incidents.

Importantly, the Court rejected the claimant’s focus on the specific duties he was scheduled to perform on the public holiday, instead determining that the ‘reasonableness’ assessment was not confined to whether the claimant was personally required to undertake urgent or frontline work on the public holiday, but extended to the broader operational requirements of WA Police and the need to maintain an available and deployable workforce.

The Court also considered the claimant’s personal circumstances. While family responsibilities are a relevant factor under s 30(4) of the MCE Act, the Court found that the reasons advanced in the claimant’s application lacked sufficient detail and did not justify his request not to work. In particular, the Court noted that the claimant had acknowledged that his wife was available to care for the children on the public holiday.

The Court further observed that the claimant had previously worked on public holidays and could reasonably have expected that he might be requested to do so again. It also noted that police officers receive employment benefits, including additional annual leave and annualised remuneration arrangements, which reflect an expectation that public holiday work may be required.

The Court concluded that the Commissioner of Police had made a request within the meaning of s 30 of the MCE Act, that the request was reasonable, and that the claimant had failed to establish any contravention of the MCE Act. The claim was dismissed in its entirety. As no contravention was established, the Court also refused the claimant’s application for preventative orders and pecuniary penalties, including his allegation that any contravention constituted a serious contravention.

The full decision can be read here. 

The Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) has dismissed a claim brought by a teacher employed by the Department of Education (the claimant), who alleged he was subjected to adverse treatment after making complaints about the principal of a remote school where he had been working.

The claimant was employed by the Department of Education as a permanent teacher and had worked at several remote schools as part of the Department’s Remote Teaching Service. In April and June 2024, the claimant made complaints about the conduct and management style of the school principal. The claimant alleged that after making those complaints, he missed out on teaching opportunities at two other remote schools, was placed on leave without pay (LWOP) for several weeks, had his leave entitlements “frozen”, and was later subjected to performance management. 

The claimant argued that these actions were taken in retaliation for his complaints and sought a range of remedies, including compensation for unpaid salary amounting to $15,615, re-crediting of personal and long service leave entitlements that would have accrued but for being on LWOP, and an additional six months of paid leave. 

The respondents accepted that the claimant had made employment-related complaints but denied that any detrimental action had been taken because of those complaints. Accordingly, the Court was required to determine whether the actions relied upon by the claimant amounted to “damaging action” under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA), and if so, whether there was a causal connection between those actions and the complaints he had made.

In relation to the alleged job opportunities lost at two remote schools, the Court found that, with respect to the first school, the claimant had expressed an interest in a position but had never been offered one. The evidence showed that the principal decided not to pursue the claimant’s application after speaking with departmental staff and the claimant’s current principal regarding concerns about his performance and suitability. The Court accepted that the decision-maker was unaware of the claimant’s complaints and was motivated solely by information concerning the claimant’s teaching performance and conduct.

The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the second remote school. Although the principal initially indicated that a position would be available, the offer was later withdrawn after it became apparent that the proper recruitment process, including consultation with the local school council, had not been followed. The Court accepted evidence that the principal did not know about the claimant’s complaints, did not know the claimant’s current principal, and only withdrew the offer because the required recruitment procedures had not been followed.

In relation to the claimant’s placement on LWOP between October and November 2024, the Court accepted that: 
1)    the claimant had completed his remote teaching placement, had exhausted his remote service leave, and remained without a new placement making the claimant an “unattached teacher”; 
2)    the Department had a practice of placing unattached teachers on LWOP to prevent overpayment while redeployment arrangements were being finalised (LWOP procedure); 
3)    the department’s LWOP procedure was the reason the claimant was placed on LWOP (and why his leave accruals temporarily ceased accruing), rather than the claimant’s complaints.

The claimant also alleged that he had been placed on performance management because of his complaints. However, the Court found there was insufficient evidence to establish that any performance management process constituted damaging action or that the current principal had any involvement in it. 

While the Court accepted that some of the matters raised by the claimant, such as the withdrawal of an employment offer at the second school and the placement on LWOP, were capable of constituting damaging action, it found that none of the actions raised by the claimant occurred because he had made complaints about his current principal. Accordingly, the claim was dismissed.

The full decision can be read here.

In November 2025, the claimant, who had been employed by the respondent as an Asset Manager in Karratha from April 2014 until December 2024, commenced proceedings in the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) under the Small Claims procedure alleging that the respondent contravened s 90(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) by failing to include various annualised allowances (totalling approximately $61,000 inclusive of superannuation) in the payment of his accrued annual leave and long service leave on termination.

The claimant contended that those allowances (including a location allowance, housing allowance, availability allowance and overtime allowance) were paid when he took annual leave and public holiday leave during his employment and therefore would have been payable had he taken the accrued leave before his employment ended.

The respondent denied that there was a legal obligation in either the employment contract or the enterprise agreement requiring it to pay the allowances during annual leave or long service leave, or to include them in any termination payments. The respondent relied on ss 90(1) and (2) of the Act to support its contention that accrued annual leave is paid out on termination at an employee's base rate of pay (as defined in s 16 of the Act and, relevantly, excluding monetary allowances). The respondent further submitted that because the Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA) (LSL Act) did not apply to the claimant during his employment pursuant to s 4A(4) of that Act, the payment of LSL was governed by the Agreement, which  provided for the payment of LSL at the base salary rate, exclusive of allowances.

The Court was required to determine whether any of the allowances were payable upon termination for the purpose of calculating accrued and untaken annual and long service leave, and if so, whether there was a legal obligation giving rise to their payment.

In relation to annual leave, the Court considered each allowance separately.

The Court found that the location allowance and housing allowance were payable under both the enterprise agreement and the claimant’s employment contract. These allowances formed part of the claimant’s total remuneration and were intended to compensate employees for the additional costs associated with living and working in regional WA. As the allowances were not confined to periods when the claimant was actively working and, if paid annually rather than fortnightly, would have covered periods of annual leave in any event, the Court concluded they would have been payable had the claimant taken his accrued annual leave and therefore should have been included in his annual leave payout on termination.

The Court reached a different conclusion regarding the availability allowance and overtime allowance. It found these allowances were linked to the claimant’s availability to perform work and, in the case of the overtime allowance, were paid at the respondent’s discretion. The Court held that there was no entitlement under the enterprise agreement to continue paying these allowances during annual leave. Although the respondent had historically chosen to continue paying them while the claimant was on leave, that practice did not create a legal obligation to include them in the payout of untaken annual leave on termination.

The Court also rejected the claimant’s argument that any of the allowances should have been included in his long service leave payment.

Regardless of whether the entitlement was assessed under the Agreement or under the LSL Act, the Court found that long service leave was payable at the claimant's base rate of pay. Both the agreement and the legislation expressly excluded allowances from the calculation of long service leave payments. As a result, none of the allowances were required to be included in the calculation of the claimant’s long service leave entitlement.

The Court found that the respondent had contravened s 44 of the Act by failing to comply with the National Employment Standards, specifically by failing to include the location and housing allowances in the claimant's annual leave payout as required by s 90(2) of the Act. It ordered the respondent to pay the claimant a further $11,981.60 in annual leave entitlements and $1,377.88 in superannuation relating to those amounts.

The remainder of the claim, including the claim for availability and overtime allowances and for additional long service leave payments, was dismissed.

The full decision can be read here.

The Australian Workers Union (claimant) brought proceedings in the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) on behalf of a former employee, alleging that his employer (the respondent) unlawfully deducted money from his wages, therefore failing to pay him in full in relation to the performance of work as required under s 323(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act).

The deduction arose due to the employee being paid an incorrect allowance, resulting in an overpayment of approximately $1,195.50. Upon identifying the error, the respondent recovered the overpayment by deducting $597.75 from the employee’s wages over two fortnightly pay periods.

The claimant alleged that the deductions breached the Act because the employee had not authorised the deductions in writing nor had the deductions been for the employee’s benefit. The claimant sought orders requiring the respondent to repay the deducted amount, together with interest and a civil penalty. 

The respondent accepted that the overpayment had occurred and that the deductions were made. However, it argued that the deductions were lawful because the employee’s employment contract contained a term allowing the recovery of overpayments, or alternatively, because the applicable industry award permitted deductions. It also relied on a telephone conversation in which the employee was advised of the overpayment and did not object to the proposed repayment arrangement.

The Court found that while the employment contract contained a general provision allowing the recovery of overpayments, this did not satisfy the requirements of the Act. The legislation requires an employee’s written authorisation of particular deductions, and the employee had not signed or otherwise provided written authorisation for the deductions that were made. The Court also found that the deductions were principally for the benefit of the respondent, as they enabled it to recover its own money without needing to commence separate legal proceedings. For substantially the same reasons, the Court rejected the respondent’s reliance on the industry award, finding that any deduction authorised by the award was ineffective because the deductions were for the respondent’s benefit and were not reasonable in the circumstances.

Having found that the deductions were not authorised under the Act, the Court concluded that the respondent had failed to pay the employee in full for work performed during the relevant pay periods, amounting to a contravention of the Act. The Court ordered the respondent to repay the employee the full amount deducted, being $1,195.50, and to pay a further $105.92 in interest. The claimant’s claim for a civil penalty was not determined as part of this decision, with the issue of a penalty to be dealt with at a later hearing. 

The full decision can be read here.

The claimant was employed by the respondent as a disability support worker covered by the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services (SCHADS) Award. On 6 May 2026, the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) entered default judgment against the respondent after it failed to lodge a response to the claimant’s originating claim for underpayment within the time allowed. The Court ordered the respondent to pay more than $19,000 in unpaid wages, superannuation, personal and annual leave, and $461 in pre-judgment interest.

This decision concerned whether a civil penalty should also be imposed for the respondent’s contraventions of sections 44 and 323 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act).

The claimant gave evidence that he had been paid regularly from September 2024 until November 2025, when the respondent stopped paying wages for work performed over a period of approximately four weeks. The claimant also did not receive payment for accrued annual leave on his termination or for personal leave taken during his employment. According to the claimant, he repeatedly raised the issue of unpaid wages with the respondent's officers and was told that payment would be made.

The respondent did not provide a response to the claimant’s evidence or outline of submission, or provide any explanation for the non-payment of entitlements.

In assessing the appropriate penalty, the Court found that the respondent had committed three separate contraventions of the Act, including:
•    failing to pay in full for the performance of work (s 323(1) of the Act);
•    failing to pay accrued and untaken annual leave on termination (s 44 of the Act); and
•    failing to pay taken personal leave entitlements (s 44 of the Act).

The Court rejected any suggestion that the contraventions arose from a single course of conduct, noting that each contravention involved separate failures of minimum entitlements under the Act.

The Court found the conduct to be deliberate on the basis that the claimant had previously been paid correctly, the respondent was aware of its obligations, and there was no evidence suggesting the contraventions resulted from a misunderstanding, administrative error or genuine dispute. The Court also noted evidence that senior management was involved in the conduct and that there had been no cooperation, contrition or corrective action by the respondent.

The Court placed particular emphasis on the vulnerability of workers in the disability and community services sector, accepting that support workers often continue providing essential care to high-needs NDIS participants even if their wages and entitlements are unpaid, making them especially susceptible to exploitation. Further, the Court observed that workers in this sector may be less aware of their industrial rights and less able to enforce them.

The Court held that both specific and general deterrence strongly favoured the imposition of a substantial penalty. Specific deterrence was important because the respondent had not paid the outstanding entitlements, had failed to engage with the proceedings at any stage and had recently registered two new businesses. The Court considered there was a real risk of future contraventions unless meaningful penalties were imposed. General deterrence was also significant to reinforce that employers in the community services sector must comply with minimum employment standards.

Having regard to all relevant factors, the Court imposed penalties of:
•    $20,000 for failing to pay wages in full;
•    $15,000 for failing to pay accrued annual leave on termination; and
•    $10,000 for failing to pay personal leave entitlements.

This resulted in a total penalty of $45,000, representing approximately 16% of the applicable maximum penalty of $297,000. The Court ordered that the penalty be paid directly to the claimant. 

The full decision can be read here.

The Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union  (claimant) lodged an originating claim in the Industrial Magistrates Court (Court) alleging Qube Ports Pty Ltd (respondent) contravened a clause in two enterprise agreements – the Qube Ports Pty Ltd Port of Port Hedland Enterprise Agreement 2016 (EA 2016) and the Qube Ports Pty Ltd Port of Port Hedland Enterprise Agreement 2020 (EA 2020) (the Agreements) – by failing to pay an employee overtime rates in hourly increments for work exceeding 12 hours in a shift. In doing so, the claimant alleged that the respondent committed two contraventions of ss 50 and 323 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) due to its non-compliance with the Agreements, each constituting a breach of a civil remedy provision. The claimant sought orders for payment of $15,007.70 owing under the Agreements, pre-judgment interest, and the imposition of civil penalties for the contraventions totalling $131,460 – being 35% of the maximum penalty for each contravention – with any penalties payable to the claimant.

The respondent conceded that it had inadvertently failed to pay the Employee overtime rates in accordance with clause 7.3 of the Agreements between 12 April 2019 and 5 August 2024 thereby contravening ss 50 and 323 of the FWA. Following an internal review, the respondent calculated the shortfall to be $16,569.95 (gross) which it paid, going beyond what was sought in the claim.  The respondent contended that the error arose due to an inadvertent payroll system misconfiguration rather than deliberate conduct and submitted that it only became aware of the issue upon receipt of the claim, as it had not been raised through the Agreements’ dispute resolution process. The respondent denied that any further orders were necessary. The key issue for the Court was the appropriate penalty for the admitted contraventions.

In support of an order for a pecuniary penalty the claimant submitted that the penalty sought was necessary for deterrence in circumstances where the contraventions were not an isolated oversight but a sustained, systemic failure to properly remunerate the employee, the respondent was a persistent offender with a history of non-compliance with ss 50 and 323, and, as a large multinational, ought to have adequate systems and resources to ensure compliance. The claimant further contended that meeting its legal obligation after the claim was lodged was not mitigatory, and that any materially lower penalty would be ineffective for a company of the respondent’s size and would, in effect, disadvantage compliant employers.

The respondent submitted that a nominal penalty was appropriate, emphasising that it had rectified the underpayment, was unaware of the inadvertent system configuration error, and that neither the claimant nor the employee had raised the issue through the dispute resolution procedure. It further contended that there was no intention to contravene the FWA, and that it had taken corrective action to update and enhance its workplace management system through automation and more rigorous consistency checks. In those circumstances, it submitted that a higher penalty was not warranted.

The Court found that the four contraventions arose from a single course of conduct namely an unintended payroll misconfiguration involving the same employee at the same port and under the same clause of the Agreements. Applying the common law course of conduct principles, it held that the contraventions stemmed from a single underlying failure, such that any penalty should avoid “double punishment” for what was, in substance, the same conduct.

The Court found that the imposition of a civil penalty would do little to advance deterrence, as the contraventions were not deliberate or designed to avoid statutory obligations. While the respondent had a prior history of contraventions of ss 50 and 323 of the FWA, those matters involved different factual circumstances. While the Court noted the respondent’s size and complex operations, it gave weight to the absence of senior management involvement and its strong cooperation, prompt rectification (including payment exceeding the claimed amount), contrition, and system improvements. The Court acknowledged that the employee suffered no loss beyond delayed payment (which was remedied), however, emphasised that responsibility for accurate payroll systems rests with the employer, and that some penalty remained necessary for deterrence, albeit significantly below the penalty sought by the applicant.

The Court emphasised the need for both specific and general deterrence, noting that even inadvertent contraventions arising from carelessness or system deficiencies warrant sanction to promote compliance and proper payroll governance. The Court characterised the respondent’s conduct at the lower end of seriousness and, applying established penalty principles (including totality and avoidance of double punishment), imposed a reduced aggregate penalty of $9,600 (significantly below the theoretical maximum of $375,600) payable to the claimant. Although no further compensation order was required given the underpayment had been remedied, the Court awarded $2,982 in pre-judgment interest to reflect the delay in payment.

The full decision can be read here.

The Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) has dismissed a claim brought by an employee (the claimant) engaged by a beekeeping and honey production business, who alleged he was entitled to unpaid annual leave and sick leave.

The claimant was employed by the respondent between October 2020 and January 2025, performing a range of duties including extracting honey, cleaning, maintenance, deliveries and general assistance with production. After his employment ended, the claimant sought over $13,000 for unpaid annual and sick leave, arguing that he was, and had always been, a part-time employee covered by the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing Award 2010 (Food and Beverage Award).

The respondent denied the claim, maintaining that the claimant was at all times employed as a casual employee (and therefore not entitled to paid annual and sick leave) and that his employment was covered by the Pastoral Award 2020. On reviewing the claim, the respondent accepted that it had underpaid the claimant under the Pastoral Award, as a casual employee, and calculated a shortfall of $2,379.44 in wages and $256.69 in superannuation. Having regard to this admission, the Court made orders for payment of those amounts, with the balance of the claim proceeding to a hearing. The remaining issues for determination were: 1) which modern award applied to the claimant’s employment, and 2) whether the claimant was employed as a casual or part-time employee.

Award coverage 

The Court rejected the respondent’s position that the Pastoral Award (which covers farming and livestock work) applied. While the business involved beekeeping and the definition of “livestock” in that Award includes insects, the Court found that none of the relevant classifications for farm or livestock workers matched the work performed by the claimant. Instead, the claimant’s duties (such as extracting, handling, processing and packaging honey) were more closely aligned with food production activities. On that basis, the Court determined that the Food and Beverage Award was the most appropriate, classifying the claimant at the lowest level under that award.

Part time or casual employment 

The claimant argued that he worked regular hours, typically on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and that there was an agreement he would work at least 30 hours per fortnight. However, after reviewing the timesheets, payroll records, text message exchanges and witness evidence, the Court found that this was not supported by the evidence and that the claimant’s account was not reliable.

Instead, the Court found that the claimant’s hours were highly variable, with differing start and finish times and no consistent pattern of work. While he often worked particular days, he also worked on other days or did not work at all. The evidence showed that he frequently informed the employer when he would not attend work, and that the employer either asked whether he was available for work or advised him when no work was required.

In these circumstances, the Court concluded that there was no firm commitment to ongoing or regular work. Rather, the arrangement operated on an “as needed” basis, in which work was offered based on the respondent’s requirements, and the claimant could choose whether to accept it. The Court also found that the employment was described by the parties as casual and that the hourly rate paid was consistent with casual employment, including a casual loading.

Accordingly, the Court determined that the claimant was a casual employee. As a result, he was not entitled to paid annual leave or paid personal (sick) leave under the National Employment Standards or the Food and Beverage Award, those entitlements being compensated by the casual loading.
While the Court observed that the respondent may have further underpaid the claimant by approximately $155.51 due to applying a casual rate under the incorrect award, the claim was ultimately dismissed. This was because the claimant’s case proceeded on the basis that he was a part-time employee entitled to paid leave, which the Court did not accept.

The full decision can be read here.

The Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (the claimant) brought a claim in the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) alleging that Bhagwan Marine Limited (the respondent) contravened s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to comply with a clause in its Enterprise Agreement requiring the conversion of eight casual positions to permanent within four weeks of registration (the conversion clause), being by 16 October 2024. The claimant sought the imposition of a civil penalty payable to itself. 

The respondent initially denied the contravention but, in its amended response, admitted that it had failed to comply with the conversion clause within the prescribed timeframe. Nonetheless, the respondent contended that a penalty was not warranted, relying on its belief that there was an informal understanding with the claimant permitting delayed compliance, the complexity of its industrial operations, its 27 year history with no prior contraventions, and the fact that the delay was not deliberate and resulted in employees receiving a financial benefit of $125,967.69, as permanent entitlements were backdated and the casual loading was not recovered.

As the respondent admitted to the contravention, the sole issue for determination was the appropriate penalty, if any. The Court found that the conversion clause was clear and unambiguous, and that the four-week timeframe was a product of a negotiated agreement between the parties and not “arbitrary” as contended by the respondent. The Court rejected the existence of any agreed deferral of compliance, noting the absence of supporting evidence and preferring the claimant’s evidence of repeated follow-up requests for compliance. The Court held that, having agreed to the clause, the respondent was required to comply with it once the agreement acquired statutory force under s 50 of the FW Act.

In assessing the contravention, the Court found that the respondent was aware of its obligations but knowingly deferred compliance, with the conversion process commencing approximately two months after the deadline and concluding over four months late. While the delay was not motivated by any intention to secure a financial or industrial advantage and, in fact, resulted in a financial detriment, the Court characterised the breach as not inadvertent. The involvement of multiple levels of management, coupled with a lack of evidence explaining inaction during the initial compliance period, weighed against the respondent.

The Court accepted that the employees did not suffer financial loss, having received both backdated entitlements and ongoing casual loading, and that the respondent had no prior contraventions and acted in circumstances involving a one-off obligation. It also accepted evidence of contrition, cooperation, and steps taken to reinforce compliance. However, the Court emphasised that the financial consequences of the delay were a product of the respondent’s own decision-making and did not replace the need for a civil penalty. 

The Court held that both specific and general deterrence warranted the imposition of a penalty. While specific deterrence was moderated by the respondent’s history and the one-off nature of the obligation, general deterrence was significant in ensuring adherence to negotiated timeframes and maintaining confidence in and the integrity of the collective bargaining process.

Having regard to all relevant factors, the Court imposed a pecuniary penalty of $5,634 (being 6% of the maximum penalty of $93,900), reflecting the lower end of seriousness, in recognition of the absence of a deliberate attempt to gain financial or industrial advantage, the respondent’s contrition, the lack of financial loss suffered by employees and the fact it was the respondent’s first contravention. The Court ordered that the penalty be paid to the claimant.

The full decision can be read here.

The claimant, an Industrial Inspector with the Department of Local Government, Industry Regulation and Safety, brought a claim in the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (Court) against Downings Pty Ltd (first respondent) and its sole director (second respondent). The claimant alleged that the first respondent failed to comply with a compliance notice issued under s 84Q of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) requiring payment of $7,251.52 in outstanding long service leave entitlements (LSL entitlement) to a former employee (the employee), thereby contravening s 84T(1) of the IR Act. The claimant also alleged that the second respondent was knowingly involved in the contravention and sought civil penalties under s 83E(1)(a) and (b) of the IR Act against both respondents, as well as an order that the outstanding LSL entitlement be paid, with the respondents jointly and severally liable.

The respondents did not file formal responses to the claim within the specified time, and a default judgment was entered, requiring the respondents to pay the outstanding LSL entitlement and costs. The claim continued to a final hearing where the Court was required to determine the appropriate civil penalty. The evidence established the employee had been employed by the first respondent from 2011 to 2023 and, upon resignation, was owed LSL entitlements. Although the respondents initially made partial payments totalling $10,000, a balance of $7,251.52 remained unpaid despite repeated requests and the subsequent issuance of a compliance notice.

The Court accepted that the respondents’ failure to comply with the compliance notice arose from financial incapacity, noting the business had ceased trading following its sale and had no assets or income. While the respondents’ engagement with the Industrial Inspector was limited after September 2023, they had made partial payments, and the second respondent expressed contrition. The Court also gave limited weight to the respondents’ failure to comply with a compliance notice in the federal jurisdiction (for the non-payment of annual leave), as it arose from the same factual background. Further, the Court held that in the circumstances, specific deterrence was of lesser significance given that the first respondent had ceased trading and the second respondent was unlikely to resume business operations.

Notwithstanding this, the Court emphasised the importance of compliance notices as an enforcement mechanism under the IR Act and the need for general deterrence to ensure compliance with statutory obligations. The Court also noted the ongoing loss suffered by the employee, including financial and personal impacts arising from the prolonged non-payment of LSL entitlements.

Having regard to all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the contravention, the respondents’ circumstances, and the need for general deterrence, the Court ordered the first respondent to pay a penalty of $30,000 and the second respondent a penalty of $4,000, both payable to the claimant.

The full decision can be read here.

The claimant brought a claim in the Industrial Magistrates Court (Court) using the small claims procedure under section 548 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA).

The claimant contended that

1. he was employed as a chef at the Hong Kong Tea Café, operated by Cheung Brothers (WA) Pty Ltd (the respondent), for four hours on 17 July 2025,
2. the Restaurant Industry Award 2020 [MA000119] (the Award) applied to his employment, and
3. the respondent failed to pay him $146.22 for work performed in contravention of the FWA.

The respondent denied the claim, contending that the claimant was not employed but instead participated in a work trial on the relevant date. The central issue for determination was therefore whether the claimant was employed by the respondent as a casual employee (as opposed to undertaking a work trial) and, if so, whether the Award applied to and covered his employment.

The claimant relied on his witness statement and oral evidence, asserting that he had responded to a WeChat advertisement for a grill chef position, had a brief face-to-face conversation with the respondent’s director and was told to work at the Café on 17 July 2025, for which he would be paid. The claimant gave evidence that during the shift he performed the duties of a grill chef, cooking orders independently with minimal supervision, other than initial guidance from the Head Chef regarding the location of ingredients and plating requirements. 

The respondent relied on the evidence of its Manager, Accounts and Operations (Managing Director). The Managing Director stated that the claimant attended a work trial to assess his suitability for the role and that he was supervised by the Head Chef. She further claimed that the Head Chef reported to her that the claimant could not handle the work independently or be classified as a chef. 

The Court found the claimant’s evidence to be more direct and persuasive, noting that the Managing Director’s evidence was largely based on what others had told her, rather than her own observations or direct involvement. The Court also noted that the respondent did not call its director or the Head Chef to give evidence about their conversations or interactions with the claimant. 

The Court found that the claimant attended the Café on 17 July for four hours in response to a WeChat advertisement for chefs and kitchen hands posted by the respondent’s director. While the conversation between the claimant and the director lacked detail, it included an understanding that the claimant would be paid for the work performed while being assessed. Other than some preliminary guidance, the claimant cooked orders without supervision, including from the Head Chef. In all the circumstances the Court found that the ‘objective reality of the relationship’ was one of casual employment, rather than participation in a bona fide paid or unpaid work trial. The Court also found that the Award applied to the claimant’s employment and that the respondent was required to pay him in accordance with its terms. By failing to do so, the respondent breached s 45 of the FWA. 

The Court, accepting the claimant’s claimed Award hourly rate of $32.31, determined that for four hours of work, the claimant was entitled to $129.24 plus pre-judgment interest of $4.21 pursuant to s 547(2) of the FWA. Accordingly, the respondent was ordered to pay the claimant a total of $133.45. 

The full decision can be read here.