2026 WAIRC 00298
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA


CITATION
:
2026 WAIRC 00298



CORAM
:
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE D. SCADDAN



HEARD
:
WEDNESDAY, 13 MAY 2026



DELIVERED
:
WEDNESDAY, 13 MAY 2026



FILE NO.
:
M 46 OF 2026



BETWEEN
:
TURAL HAJIZADA


CLAIMANT





AND





BILA COUNSELLING & SUPPORT SERVICES PTY LTD


RESPONDENT

CatchWords : INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – Assessment of pecuniary penalties for contraventions of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – Employment under a modern award – Underpayment of wages and other entitlements
Legislation : Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA)
Instrument : Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Award [MA000100]
Case(s) referred : Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA
to in reasons: 81
Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu [2020] FCCA 2032
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; (2022) 274 CLR 450
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [No 2] [2018] FCA 1211; (2018) 70 AILR 102-975
Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union v Qube Ports Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 208
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Powell [No 2] [2019] FCA 972
Result : Penalty imposed
Representation:
Claimant : Self-represented
Respondent : No appearance



REASONS FOR DECISION (PENALTY)
(Given extemporaneously at the conclusion of the hearing, edited by her Honour for expression and to include headings, a postscript, and complete references and citations)
1 On 6 May 2026, the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia (IMC) entered judgment in default against the respondent where the respondent failed to lodge a response to the claimant’s originating claim within the required period of time. Pursuant to reg 8(2) of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA), when read with s 545(3) of the FWA, judgment was entered against the respondent in the amount of $19,368.42 for failing to lodge a response to the originating claim.

2 In doing so, the IMC found the respondent was in breach of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) (by failing to pay entitlements under the FWA and the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Award [MA000100] (commonly known as the SCHADS Award)) and ordered as follows:
(a) $10,575.74 for wages and superannuation not paid in full for the performance of work, contrary to s 323(1) of the FWA, of which $1,004.13 is to be paid to a Superannuation Fund for the benefit of the claimant;
(b) $2,930.57 for taken but unpaid personal leave pursuant to s 96(1) of the FWA, contrary to s 44 of the FWA, when read with s 61(2)(e) of the FWA;
(c) $5,862.11 for accrued but untaken annual leave payable upon termination of employment pursuant to s 90(2) of the FWA, contrary to s 44 of the FWA, when read with s 61(2)(d) of the FWA; and
(d) pursuant to reg 12 of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (the Regulations), when read with s 547 of the FWA, the respondent is to pay interest on the pre-judgment amount fixed at $461.66.
3 A contravention of s 44 and s 323(1) of the FWA is a contravention of a civil remedy penalty provision when read with s 539(2) of the FWA.
4 This is the decision with respect to the appropriate penalty, if any, to be imposed for the respondent’s contraventions of s 44 and s 323 of the FWA.
5 Programming orders were made at the hearing of the claimant’s application for default judgment, with the respondent being given a (further) opportunity to be heard on the issue of the imposition of a civil penalty.
Evidence
Claimant
6 The claimant relied upon his witness statement lodged on 8 May 2026 with numerous documents annexed to this witness statement. Exhibit 1 – Witness Statement of Tural Hajizada signed on 8 May 2026 with annexures.

7 He states he was employed under a written employment contract dated 20 November 2024, and his employment was covered by the SCHADS Award at classification SCS-L-P3. He commenced as a casual employee and converted to part-time permanent from approximately November 2024.
8 He further states the sole director and secretary of the respondent throughout his employment was Lenard Swanepoel-Trollip, as confirmed by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) records. The claimant says Mr Swanepoel-Trollip was the only known person with authority to manage the respondent during his employment.
9 According to the claimant, the respondent paid his wages regularly from September 2024 until 20 November 2025. The last payslip recording a payment to the claimant covered the fortnight of 1 to 14 November 2025, which was paid on 20 November 2025.
10 From 15 November 2025 to 12 December 2025, the respondent did not pay him his wages for the time worked during this period. This amount referrable to this period remains outstanding.
11 The claimant ceased employment on or around 30 December 2025 because it was too stressful to continue not being paid by the respondent.
12 The claimant says he did not receive any explanation or warning from the respondent for the non-payment of his wages, and without any offer of a revised payment date.
13 The claimant explains that on five occasions he had conversations with either Christiaan Swanepoel-Trollip or Mr Swanepoel-Trollip. Christiaan Swanepoel-Trollip, an officer of the respondent, told him that already-earned wages would only be paid after employees signed new employment contracts. The claimant says he refused this condition, explaining that he was not required to sign a new contract in order to receive wages already earned under his existing contract, and requested payment of his earned wages in accordance with his current contractual obligations. Christiaan Swanepoel-Trollip then promised to inform Mr Swanepoel-Trollip to transfer payment for the unpaid wages on 8 December 2025. This did not happen.
14 The claimant states that the failure to pay his wages caused him significant financial hardship and psychological harm. He is a student at Monash University studying a Psychology degree, where his fees are $6,762.50 per unit per semester.
15 The non-payment of wages made it impossible to meet his financial obligations to the extent that he was forced to borrow money from friends with no clear return date, an experience he found to be a deeply stressful and humiliating experience even when it involved close friends.
16 The claimant states he was medically certified unfit to work from 9 to 26 December 2025 by Dr Navid Akhlaghi of Spearwood Medical Centre, and from 24 December 2025 to 4 January 2026 by Dr Mahadeva Prasad of Victa Health, due to the stress and anxiety caused by the respondent's failure to pay his wages.
17 While the claimant has a pre-existing diagnosis of adjustment disorder with symptoms of mild anxiety, the respondent’s conduct significantly worsened this pre-existing condition.
18 The claimant states that while his wages remained unpaid, Mr Swanepoel-Trollip has registered Ubuntu Support Services on 27 February 2026 and Kirinex Pty Ltd on 6 March 2026. Both are new operating entities conducting the same business as the respondent, confirmed by public ASIC records. The claimant raises a concern about the establishment of new businesses while employee debts remained outstanding.
19 The claimant refers to the respondent’s failure to engage with any legal proceedings arising from its non-payment of his wages, including that the respondent did not respond to any of the three formal written complaints made in December 2025. The respondent did not respond to his formal demands for the payment of entitlements made in January 2026, did not lodge a response to his originating claim served on 27 March 2026, and did not respond to his application for default judgment served on 24 April 2026.
20 The claimant explains that he worked in the disability support sector providing care to NDIS participants with high needs, including participants with severe autism requiring round-the-clock support. Workers in this sector cannot simply stop working when wages are withheld because the participants in their care require continuous support and to leave them without a carer is not an option.
21 The claimant is subject to a bridging visa since his employment with the respondent ceased, whereas he was previously subject to a 486 visa (employment sponsored visa).
22 The claimant characterises the respondent's conduct as exploitative due to the fundamental nature of disability support work. During the period of non-payment, support workers caring for one of the clients were required to organise rosters among themselves through a self-created WhatsApp group because the respondent had become unreachable and provided no management support.
Respondent
23 The respondent provided no response to the claimant’s evidence.
Contentions
24 Schedule I to these reasons sets out a summary of the principles relevant to the imposition of a civil penalty. 
Claimant
25 In summary, the claimant submits that:
(a) there are several contraventions for which a civil penalty should be imposed. I note that several of the suggested contraventions did not form part of the originating claim and do not form part of the contraventions identified by the IMC for the purposes of default judgment;
(b) the contraventions were deliberate and sustained contraventions, where the respondent did not pay wages for two consecutive fortnights without a reasonable explanation. This was not an administrative oversight or a one-off error;
(c) the respondent's director and officers made admissions that the wages were owed;
(d) the support services industry employs vulnerable workers and can easily exploit their position. The claimant and his former colleagues were disability support workers providing essential care to NDIS participants with high needs;
(e) the respondent’s director has registered new companies while the claimant’s wages and other entitlements remain unpaid;
(f) the respondent has failed to engage with any part of the proceedings to recover the claimant’s unpaid wages and other entitlements;
(g) the IMC should impose substantial penalties for each contravention, having regard to the serious aggravating factors identified by the claimant and having regard to the need for both specific and general deterrence in the disability support sector;
(h) the claimant notes that courts have imposed penalties in the range of 30% to 70% of the maximum where contraventions are deliberate and sustained, involve vulnerable workers, and where the respondent has shown no contrition or cooperation: Fair Work Ombudsman v Blue Impression Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 81; Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu [2020] FCCA 2032; and
(i) applying a penalty of 40% to 60% of the maximum across the established contraventions, represents an appropriate total penalty in all of the circumstances.
Respondent
26 The respondent did not provide any response to the claimant’s outline of submissions.
Determination
The Nature, Extent and Circumstances of the Conduct
27 The extent of the respondent’s conduct occurred during the last weeks of the claimant’s employment before the claimant resigned from the employment. It extended over a four-week period as it relates to the non-payment of wages and continued after the claimant’s employment once his employment terminated.
Course of Conduct
28 The respondent’s contraventions are three discrete and separate failures to comply with the FWA:
(a) one contravention of s 323(1) of the FWA in failing to pay in full for the performance of work; Even if the failure to pay wages over two sequential fortnightly periods did constitute two contraventions of s 323(1), arguably, s 557(1) of the FWA operates and the failure to pay wages in full for performance of work is one course of action.

(b) one contravention of s 44 of the FWA relating to the non-payment of accrued and untaken annual leave upon termination of employment; and
(c) one contravention of s 44 of the FWA relating to the failure to pay personal leave.
29 It cannot be said that each of these contraventions arose from the same course of conduct. One contravention occurred because the respondent failed to pay in full wages for work undertaken by the claimant. One contravention occurred because the respondent failed to pay the claimant for personal leave taken during employment. One contravention arose after the termination of employment where the respondent failed to pay accrued and untaken annual leave.
30 Each of these contraventions involved separate failures of minimum entitlements under the FWA.
Deliberate Conduct
31 I accept the claimant’s evidence that the respondent conduct was deliberate. The claimant was employed by the respondent pursuant to an employment contract and carried out work while employed by the respondent. The claimant had been paid for work undertaken up until 15 November 2025, and then he was not paid from 15 November 2025 to 12 December 2025 for work performed by him.
32 The clamant was then not paid accrued and untaken annual leave upon the termination of his employment with the respondent and he was not paid personal leave during his employment.
Similar Previous Conduct
33 There are no previous recorded contraventions by the respondent attracting a penalty. However, the IMC notes that it has entered judgment in default against the respondent for other employees in similar circumstances to the claimant.
Applicable Maxima
34 The maximum penalty with respect to a contravention of s 44 and s 323(1) of the FWA by the respondent is 300 penalty units for each contravention, given the respondent is a body corporate. The penalty unit value at the time of the contravention was $313. A postscript to these reasons provides a correction to the amount.

35 Therefore, where there are three contraventions, the theoretical maximum is $281,700. A postscript to these reasons provides a correction to the amount.

Size of the Respondent
36 There is no information about the size of the respondent’s business, although the claimant states that he worked with other colleagues.
37 At best this is a neutral factor for consideration.
Involvement of Senior Management
38 I accept the claimant’s evidence that there is one director of the respondent, and a person with the same surname as the director was an officer of the respondent. Accordingly, I find that senior management was involved in the contraventions.
Cooperation, Contrition and Corrective Action
39 There has been no cooperation by the respondent in the legal proceedings. The respondent just has not participated at any stage with the claimant with respect to the claimant’s demands for payment or with the legal proceedings.
40 The respondent has not shown any contrition.
41 There is no information about any corrective action taken by the respondent, although this seems unlikely.
Loss of Damage Suffered
42 The claimant details the loss he has suffered because of the contraventions and the effect that this has had upon him personally.
43 The amount owed to the claimant remains unpaid. It is not an insignificant amount that remains outstanding.
Deterrence
44 Consistent with comments made by the High Court in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; (2022) 274 CLR 450 (Pattinson) at [55], the conduct the subject of the contravention must bear a reasonable relationship to the theoretical maximum penalty.
45 In Pattinson, at [71], the majority judgment concluded that a court’s ‘real task under s 546’ is ‘fixing the penalty which it considers fairly and reasonably to be appropriate to protect the public interest from future contraventions of the Act where, at [58], ‘the maximum penalty is intended by the Act to be imposed in respect of a contravention warranting the strongest deterrence within the prescribed cap’. To that end, both the circumstances of the contravention(s) and the respondent’s circumstances may be relevant to the assessment as to whether the maximum level of deterrence is required.
46 In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [No 2] [2018] FCA 1211; (2018) 70 AILR 102-975 (also referred to in Pattinson at [26]), Tracey J stated at [20]:
[T]he maximum penalty may be appropriate for a person who has repeatedly contravened the same or similar legislative provisions despite having been penalised regularly over a period of time for such misconduct. The gravity of the offending, in such cases, is to be assessed by reference to the nature and the quality of the recidivism rather than by comparison of individual instances of offending: see Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 1462 at [8] (Jessup J). Relevant matters will include the number of contraventions which have occurred over a period, whether the ongoing misconduct is the result of conscious decisions, whether the repeated contravenor has treated the payment of penalties as a cost of doing business and whether any attempt has been made to comply with the law as declared by the Court.
Outcome
47 To my mind specific deterrence has a significant role to play with respect to the respondent’s contravention. That is, the contravention arose from a deliberate decision not to pay an employee in an industry, which is likely ripe for exploitation of workers who may be less aware of their industrial rights and less able to pursue these rights.
48 If there is any suggestion that the respondent engages in a ‘business model’ of employing people, such as the claimant, with a view to deliberately underpaying or not paying them, then any penalty should not be seen as the ‘cost of doing business’. The penalties need to be imposed at a level that makes the contravening conduct clearly unprofitable and the prospect of future contraventions unlikely.
49 The likelihood of a similar contravention occurring in the future is reasonable unless the respondent is deterred from doing so.
50 There is no contrition by the respondent and the amount owed to the claimant remains outstanding. The conduct was deliberate and egregious.
51 This leaves the issue of general deterrence. It is necessary to send a message to other employers in the community services that non-compliance with minimum standards is unacceptable.
52 Comments made by Feutrill J, at [94], in Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union v Qube Ports Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 208 have some relevance:
Contraventions are not only the consequence of intentional or deliberate conduct but carelessness, oversight and inadvertence. Part of deterrence involves encouraging employers to implement and maintain systems, policies, procedures and a culture aimed at preventing careless, unintentional or ignorant contraventions of the Act. Therefore, the size and spread of an employer’s operation is not a reason for diminishing corporate responsibility for historical contraventions as these may be indicative of systemic or underlying failings in corporate systems, policies, procedures and culture and, therefore, of an ongoing and enhanced risk of future contraventions.
53 Guidance may be derived from Bromberg J in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Powell [No 2] [2019] FCA 972 at [34] and [35]:
[T]here is no general principle that, if a person contravenes a civil penalty provision on a genuine but mistaken view on an arguable question of law, there should be no penalty. Whether or not a penalty should be imposed will always depend on all of the circumstances considered principally by reference to the need for specific and general deterrence.
It is well settled and not in contest that an honest and reasonable belief may be a relevant mitigating or ameliorating factor in determining whether or not a penalty is to be imposed and, if so, the extent of the penalty imposed. (citations omitted)
54 There is nothing before the IMC which in any way suggests the respondent had an honest and reasonable belief that it was paying the claimant correctly or in some other way complying with industrial laws.
55 I am satisfied that a reasonable penalty is warranted to deter others in the community sector industry from engaging in similar behaviour to the detriment of more vulnerable employees.
Penalty to be imposed
56 Taking all these factors into account, the appropriate penalty aimed to secure compliance by deterring repeat contraventions, if not of this type, then of any future different contraventions, is:
(a) Section 323(1) of the FWA - $20,000
(b) Section 44 of the FWA (annual leave) - $15,000
(c) Section 44 of the FWA (personal leave) - $10,000
57 The total penalty imposed is $45,000, which is approximately 16% of the maximum theoretical penalty. I do not consider any further reduction to be warranted to account for an imbalance between oppression and deterrence.
58 I do not consider that there is anything before the Court, which suggests it should be awarded other than to the successful initiating party. Accordingly, the payment of the pecuniary penalty should be paid to the claimant.
Orders
1. Pursuant to s 546(1) of the FWA, where the Court is satisfied that the respondent has contravened a civil penalty provision, the respondent is to pay a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $45,000.
2. Pursuant to s 546(3)(b) of the FWA, the pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the claimant.



REASONS FOR DECISION (POSTSCRIPT)

59 At the time of giving oral reasons for decision, I erroneously referred to the applicable penalty unit amount as $313, when the applicable penalty unit amount relevant to the date of the contravening conduct is $330.
60 Accordingly, the applicable theoretical maximum is $297,000, where the maximum for each contravention is $99,000.
61 I have considered the effect of this error on the penalties imposed and remain satisfied that the penalties ordered remain the appropriate penalty for each contravention. I am also satisfied that the total penalty imposed does not require further adjustment.



D. SCADDAN
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE


Schedule I: Pecuniary Penalty Orders Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
Pecuniary Penalty Orders 
[1] The FWA provides that the Court may order a person to pay an appropriate pecuniary penalty if the Court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision: s 546(1) of FWA. The maximum penalty for each contravention by a natural person, expressed as a number of penalty units, set out in a table found in s 539(2) of the FWA: s 546(2) of the FWA. If the contravener is a body corporate, the maximum penalty is five times the maximum number of penalty units proscribed for a natural person: s 546(2) of the FWA. 
[2] The rate of a penalty unit is set by s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): s 12 of the FWA. The relevant rate is that applicable at the date of the contravening conduct: 
Date of Contravening Conduct
Penalty Unit
December 2025
$ 313 [$350] A postscript to these reasons provides a correction to this amount.

[3] The purpose served by penalties was described by Katzmann J in Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 557 (Grouped Property Services) at [388] in the following terms (omitting citations): 
In contrast to the criminal law, however, where, in sentencing, retribution and rehabilitation are also relevant, the primary, if not the only, purpose of a civil penalty is to promote the public interest in compliance with the law. This is achieved by imposing penalties that are sufficiently high to deter the wrongdoer from engaging in similar conduct in the future (specific deterrence) and to deter others who might be tempted to contravene (general deterrence). The penalty for each contravention or course of conduct is to be no more and no less than is necessary for that purpose.
[4] In Pattinson [42], the plurality confirmed that civil penalties ‘are not retributive, but rather are protective of the public interest in that they aim to secure compliance by deterring repeat contraventions’. However, ‘insistence upon the deterrent quality of a penalty should be balanced by insistence that it “not be so high as to be oppressive”’: [40], citing NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [1996] FCA 1134; (1996) 71 FCR 285. 
[5] In Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080; (2007) 166 IR 14 [14], Tracey J adopted the following ‘nonexhaustive range of considerations to which regard may be had in determining whether particular conduct calls for the imposition of a penalty, and if it does the amount of the penalty’ which had been set out by Mowbray FM in Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7: 
(a) The nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breaches. 
(b) The circumstances in which that conduct took place. 
(c) The nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the breaches. 
(d) Whether there had been similar previous conduct by the respondent. 
(e) Whether the breaches were properly distinct or arose out of the one course of conduct. 
(f) The size of the business enterprise involved. 
(g) Whether or not the breaches were deliberate. 
(h) Whether senior management was involved in the breaches. 
(i) Whether the party committing the breach had exhibited contrition. 
(j) Whether the party committing the breach had taken corrective action. 
(k) Whether the party committing the breach had cooperated with the enforcement authorities. 
(l) The need to ensure compliance with minimum standards by provision of an effective means for investigation and enforcement of employee entitlements. 
(m) The need for specific and general deterrence. 
[6] The list is not ‘a rigid catalogue of matters for attention. At the end of the day the task of the Court is to fix a penalty which pays appropriate regard to the circumstances in which the contraventions have occurred and the need to sustain public confidence in the statutory regime which imposes the obligations.’ (Buchanan J in Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8; (2008) 165 FCR 560 (Australian Ophthalmic Supplies) [91]). 
[7] Although these factors provide useful guidance, the task of assessing the appropriate penalty is not an exact science: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 [47]. The Court must ultimately fix a penalty that pays appropriate regard to the contraventions that have occurred: Pattinson [19]. ‘[A] court empowered by s 546 to impose an “appropriate” penalty must act fairly and reasonably for the purpose of protecting the public interest by deterring future contraventions of the Act.’ Pattinson [48]. 
[8] ‘Multiple contraventions’ may occur because the contravening conduct done by an employer:
(a) resulted in a contravention of a single civil penalty provision or resulted in the contravention of multiple civil penalty provisions; 
(b) was done once only or was repeated; and 
(c) was done with respect to a single employee or was done with respect to multiple employees.
[9] The fixing of a pecuniary penalty for multiple contraventions is subject to s 557 of the FWA. It provides that two or more contraventions of specified civil remedy provisions by an employer are taken be a single contravention if the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by the employer. Subject to proof of a ‘course of conduct’, the section applies to contravening conduct that results in multiple contraventions of a single civil penalty provision whether by reason of the same conduct done on multiple occasions or conduct done once with respect to multiple employees: Rocky Holdings; Fair Work Ombudsman v South Jin Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 832 [22] (White J) The section does not apply to cases where the contravening conduct results in the contravention of multiple civil penalty provisions (example (a) above): Grouped Property Services [411] (Katzmann J). 
[10] The totality of the penalty must be re-assessed in light of the totality of the offending behaviour. If the resulting penalty is disproportionately harsh, it may be necessary to reduce the penalty for individual contraventions. Australian Ophthalmic Supplies [47] - [52]. 
[11] Section  546(3) of the FWA also provides: 
Payment of penalty
The court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to: 
(a) the Commonwealth; or 
(b) a particular organisation; or 
(c) a particular person. 
[12] In Milardovic v Vemco Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 244 [40] - [44], Mortimer J, in light of Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4; (2016) 239 FCR 336, summarised the law: (omitting citations) 
[T]he power conveyed by s 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant. … [T]he initiating party is normally the proper recipient of the penalty as part of a system of recognising particular interests in certain classes of persons … in upholding the integrity of awards and agreements the subject of penal proceedings. Where a public official vindicates the law by suing for and obtaining a penalty, it is appropriate that the penalty be paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Otherwise, the general rule remains appropriate, that the penalty is to be paid to the party initiating the proceeding, with the Gibbs [Gibbs v The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona [1992] FCA 553; 37 FCR 216] … exception that the penalty may be ordered to be paid to the organisation on whose behalf the initiating party has acted. (original emphasis)