2026 WAIRC 00264
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA


CITATION
:
2026 WAIRC 00264



CORAM
:
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE T. KUCERA



HEARD
:
MONDAY, 23 MARCH 2026



DELIVERED
:
MONDAY, 4 MAY 2026



FILE NO.
:
M 65 OF 2025



BETWEEN
:
CHARMAINE MELLOR


CLAIMANT





AND





STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA


RESPONDENT

CatchWords : INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application to set aside a default judgment where the claimant had failed to comply with a springing order – Court’s powers under regulation 8(c) of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA) – principles to be applied in an application to set aside default judgment
Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)
Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA)
Cases referred : Kanar v Gaspar [2015] WADC 89
to in reasons MTQ Holdings v Lynch [2007] WASC 49
Result : The claimant’s application is granted and the default judgment is set aside
Representation:
Claimant : Self-represented
Respondent : Mr M. McIlwaine (of counsel)



REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1 This matter involves an application that was made by Ms Charmaine Mellor (claimant) to set aside a default judgment, dismissing the proceedings (the claim) she had commenced under Part 6B, Division 2 (damaging action provisions) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (IR Act).
2 In her claim, the claimant who is unrepresented, alleged that her employer, the State of Western Australia (respondent) through the Consumer Protection Group of what is now the Department of Local Government, Industry Regulation and Safety, has taken damaging action against her because she has made employment-related complaints or inquiries within the meaning of s 97A(1) of the IR Act.
3 The respondent strenuously denies the allegations the claimant has raised in her claim and contends that while it may have taken damaging action against the claimant, there were justifiable reasons relating to the claimant’s performance and conduct that warranted the management response that followed.
4 The default judgment, the subject of this decision, was issued because of the claimant’s failure to comply with a springing order that was made on 15 December 2025, requiring the claimant to file and serve her witness statements in support of her claim by 6 January 2026 (springing order).
5 The respondent disputes that the claimant has provided a reasonable explanation for her failure to comply with the springing order. In addition, the respondent says that it has suffered prejudice because of the claimant’s delay in serving her evidence on the respondent, which the springing order was designed to prevent.
6 It is against this background that the respondent has opposed the claimant’s application to set aside the default judgment.
Background
7 The critical event giving rise to the claim is a letter the claimant, who is employed on a full-time basis as an Executive Officer – Level 5, received from Patricia Blake, the Commissioner of Consumer Protection which was headed ‘Conduct and Performance Matters’ (July 2024 letter).
8 By its July 2024 letter, the respondent informed the claimant of three matters. Firstly, that she was being placed on a performance improvement process (PIP) because she had not followed a reasonable and lawful direction to attend the office on 14 June 2024 but had instead decided to work from home.
9 Secondly, because she did not have a formal working from home arrangement in place, the respondent directed the claimant would be required to attend the office on her working days until she had an approved work from home arrangement in place (work from office direction).
10 The work from office direction was accompanied with a warning in the July 2024 letter to the effect that if the claimant failed to comply, she could face disciplinary action.
11 Thirdly, the claimant was informed that the respondent had decided to delay her pay increment for an additional six months while the PIP is in place. The July 2024 letter confirmed that the date her next increment review would occur was 7 February 2025.
Originating Claim
12 Almost ten months after she received the July 2024 letter, the claimant, on 21 May 2025, commenced her claim with the filing of an originating claim.
13 In her originating claim, which referred to the July 2024 letter, the claimant alleged that the respondent, by placing her on a PIP, delaying her pay increment and by issuing the work from office direction, had taken damaging action by altering her position to her disadvantage or otherwise injuring the claimant in relation to her employment with the respondent (damaging action).
14 The claimant initially claimed that from August 2023 until May 2025 she had made repeated complaints and inquiries on a range of issues including psychological safety, lack of training, bullying, unsafe work practices, exclusion from communications and duties and failures of support and procedural fairness (alleged complaints).
15 The claimant said that the damaging action was initiated by the respondent after she made the alleged complaints and inquiries. Further details of the alleged complaints were set out in Annexure A to the originating claim – Summary of Protected Workplace Complaints and Enquiries (Annexure A).
Response to the Claim
16 On 13 June 2025, the respondent filed a Form 2 – Response to the originating claim. The respondent disputed the allegation raised in the claim on three bases. Firstly, the respondent does not admit the claimant has made any employment related complaints or inquiries within the meaning of s 97A of the IR Act.
17 Secondly, and noting the damaging action was said to have occurred with the claimant being given the July 2024 letter, the respondent says that any alleged complaints made after 15 July 2024 are not relevant to the claim.
18 Thirdly and although the respondent admitted to taking the damaging action, the respondent denies that it was taken because the claimant had made any employment related complaints or inquiries.
19 Rather the respondent says it decided to take the action as set out in the July 2024 letter, in response to concerns about the claimant’s underperformance and because she has not met the duties set out in her job description from.
Directions to File an Amended Claim and Response
20 After the respondent filed its response, the claim was listed for a pre-trial conference before the Clerk of the Court that was held on 6 August 2025 (August conference).
21 At the conclusion of the August conference, orders issued that required the claimant to file and serve an amended statement of claim by 20 August 2025. The respondent for its part was directed to provide an amended response within 14 days of receiving an amended claim.
Amended Claim and Response Filed
22 Despite the orders that were made at the August conference, the claimant did not file an amended claim until 25 August 2025 (amended claim).
23 The amended claim in the main, removed references to anything in Annexure A which the claimant said were employment-related complaints or inquiries she made after receiving the July 2024 letter. The claimant also sought to bring new claims for relief.
24 More specifically, the claimant in addition to seeking compensation and the imposition of pecuniary penalties, sought orders that would require some of the respondent’s senior staff to undergo training, within a specified period, on subjects including the provision of procedural fairness to employees and compliance with the damaging action provisions of the IR Act.
25 On 3 September 2025 the respondent filed a response to the amended claim (amended response). By its amended response, the respondent, in addition to maintaining the defences as set out in its response to the originating claim, contended the Court did not have the power to make orders for some of the relief sought, including the orders to undergo training.
First Directions Hearing
26 Following the filing of the amended claim and the amended response, the claim was listed for a directions hearing that was held on 8 September 2025 (first directions hearing).
27 During the first directions hearing, the parties were each directed to file and serve witness statements in the matter (programming directions). Under the programming directions, the claimant was required to file and serve her witness statements by 13 October 2025.
28 The respondent for its part, was directed to file and serve any witness statements in opposition to the amended claim by 3 November 2025.
29 While the programming directions required the parties to file and serve a Statement of Agreed Facts, the only matter they were able to agree upon was:
The claimant commenced employment with the respondent on 7 August 2023, in the position of Executive Officer as a Level-5.
Programming Directions Extended
30 On 23 October 2025, the parties by consent, agreed to extend the dates by which they were each required to file and serve their witness statements.
31 By way of the minute of consent orders, it was agreed the claimant would file and serve her witness statements by 10 November 2025.
32 The parties also agreed the respondent would file and serve any witness statements by 1 December 2025.
Claimant’s Non-compliance with the Programming Orders
33 On 18 November 2025, well after the date the claimant was required to file and serve her witness statements, the claimant sent an email to Registry in which she asked for an extension of time to comply.
34 In her email, the claimant indicated that the respondent had opposed her being given an extension of time to file and serve her witness statements. The claimant said that she was advised unexpectedly that a legal advisor she had engaged was leaving their firm and was no longer able to assist her.
35 While the claimant indicated that she was attempting to obtain alternative representation, she said it would likely take between two and four weeks to meet with a new lawyer and to prepare her materials.
January Directions Hearing Listed
36 On the same day as her email, the claim was listed for a further directions hearing to be held on 27 January 2025 (January directions hearing).
37 In an email to confirm the listing dated 18 November 2025, the Registry advised that the main purpose of the January directions hearing was to:
· identify the issues that require determination at trial;
· identify any interim issues that need to be determined before the trial (if any);
· determine which facts are in dispute and which facts are not in dispute (if any);
· issue or amend the programming orders;
· list the claim for a further direction hearing and/or trial.
Claimant’s Application for an Extension of Time
38 On 29 November 2025, the claimant filed an application in which she sought an extension of time to file and serve her witness statements by 6 January 2026 (extension of time application).
39 The extension of time application was listed for a hearing held on 15 December 2025. In its response to the extension of time application, the respondent, while noting the Court had a discretion to grant the extension sought, opposed the application on the grounds the claimant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing her statements.
40 It was contended that in the context of what had already been a drawn-out claim, it would not be in the interests of justice if the extension of time to file evidence leads to the hearing date being later than it otherwise would have been.
41 The respondent also contended there was no evidence the claimant had made any progress in preparing her evidence to be filed, other than seeking alternative legal advice, which to date had not been successful.
Springing Order Made
42 During the hearing of the extension of time application, the respondent maintained its opposition to the extension sought. The respondent however submitted that if an extension was to be granted, the claimant should be required to file as much of her evidence as possible before the Christmas break so the January directions hearing would not have to be deferred.
43 The claimant said the earliest she would be able to file her witness statements would be 6 January 2026. Although the claimant said she had scheduled a meeting with a new lawyer that was to be held on 7 January 2026, the claimant was confident that she would be able to comply with this deadline.
44 As the transcript of the hearing of the extension of time application reveals, an extension of time for the claimant to file her witness statements by 6 January 2026 was granted, but on the basis that if this did not occur, her amended claim would be dismissed. Transcript, Mellor v State of Western Australia, Industrial Magistrates Court, 15 December 2025, 7; Order 2 of the Orders made on 15 December 2025.

45 Following the hearing, the springing order in the terms I earlier described in the preceding paragraph [4] was made.
Failure to Comply with the Springing Order
46 On 6 January 2026, the claimant, as directed, filed her witness statement. However, the claimant did not comply with the springing order because she did not serve her witness statement on the respondent until 7 January 2026.
47 The Court file shows that while the claimant’s witness statement was received by the Registry at 3.17 pm on Tuesday, 6 January 2026, it was not stamped as filed until 1.51 pm on Wednesday, 7 January 2026.
48 Upon receiving the stamped copy of her witness statement, the claimant served it on the respondent. The respondent says it received the claimant’s witness statement after close of business at 5.10 pm on Wednesday, 7 January 2026.
49 In short, it is reasonable to say that although the claimant filed her witness statement with the Industrial Magistrates Court on time, she did not comply with the springing order because her witness statement was served a day late.
Application to Set Aside the Default Judgment
50 On 19 January 2026 the claimant made an application to set aside the default judgment (claimant’s default application). In her Form 7 – Affidavit in support of the claimant’s default application, the claimant said she was under the impression her compliance with the springing order required service of a ‘sealed’ copy of her witness statement.
51 The claimant said that she believed she could not comply with the springing order until Registry staff had stamped and returned her witness statement, which happened on 7 January 2026. The claimant contended that the length of the delay in providing service was minimal and disputed that the respondent had suffered any significant prejudice because of the delay.
Power to Set Aside a Default Judgment
52 The power an Industrial Magistrate may exercise to set aside a default judgment that issues because of the operation of a springing order, arises under regulation 8 (Courts Powers to deal with default by a party) of the Industrial Magistrate’s Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (IMC Regs).
53 Before extracting those parts of regulation 8 that are relevant to determining this matter, it is worth having regard to regulation 5 – Court’s duties in dealing with cases, which states:
5. Court’s duties in dealing with cases
(1) The court must ensure that cases are dealt with justly.
(2) Ensuring that cases are dealt with justly includes ensuring –
(a) that cases are dealt with efficiently, economically and expeditiously;
(b) so far as is practicable, that the parties are on an equal footing; and
(c) that the courts judicial and administrative resources are used as efficiently as possible.
54 In the performance of the duties described, regulation 7 provides the Industrial Magistrates Court with quite broad case management powers.
55 Regulation 8 deals the power of an Industrial Magistrate both to make a default judgment in the event of non-compliance with a case management order and the power to set one aside. Those parts of the regulation that are relevant to the present case are in terms as follows:
8. Court’s powers to deal with default by party
…
(2) If a party does not comply with these regulations, or an order made by the court, the court may give default judgment against the party.
…
(3) The court may set aside a default judgment and may do so on any conditions it thinks fit.
Principles to be Applied
56 The principles to be applied in deciding whether a default judgment that issues because of the operation of a springing order should be set aside were set out by Sleight CJ of the District Court in Kanar v Gaspar [2015] WADC 89.
57 At [18], Sleight CJ cites the decision of Master Newnes from the Supreme Court of Western Australia in MTQ Holdings v Lynch [2007] WASC 49, who summarised these principles as follows:
1. A springing order is intended to be the last opportunity offered to a party to put its case in order: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [54].
2. It is plainly important to the administration of justice that orders of the court are complied with. Obedience to orders of the court is the foundation on which the court’s authority is founded. It follows that an approach which intends to encourage the development of a culture of non-compliance, where orders, even pre-emptory orders, of the court are not given the attention and priority they require, must inevitably lead to undermine that foundation: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [40].
3. The power to extend time when a springing order has not been complied with is a power to be exercised cautiously and with due regard to the necessity for maintaining the principle that orders are made to be complied with and not to be ignored: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [41].
4. A most relevant consideration is whether the failure to comply with the springing order is intentional and contumelious. Even in cases where the failure is not due to intentional and contumelious conduct, a party will not necessarily have the springing order set aside. There is authority, Re Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1196 at 1203, that to avoid a springing order the party seeking to obtain an extension of time must establish both that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to comply with it was due to circumstances outside the party’s control (see also Caribbean General Insurance Ltd v Frizzell Insurance Brokers Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyds Rep 32 at 37).
5. An application to set aside a judgment based upon a springing order involves the exercise of a discretion which must in the end depend upon all the circumstances of the case, without being limited by conditions or guidelines articulated in other cases, and there must always remain sufficient flexibility to make reasonable allowance for human error. Whilst it is important that legal business be conducted efficiently that is not an end in itself. The ultimate object must be to do justice: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [50]; State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 1; (1997) 189 CLR 146 at 155.
6. While no hard and fast rules can be laid down as to the matters to which the court should have regard, the exercise of the discretion of the court will normally have regard to the following matters:
(i) the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made;
(ii) the reason for non-compliance with the springing order;
(iii) the prejudice to the defaulting party if the time was not extended; and
(iv) the prejudice to the other party if the time were extended: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [55].
7. It will normally be a relevant consideration whether or not the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case on the merits – there being no point in resuscitating a case that is devoid of merit – but, on the other hand, the fact that a party has an apparently meritorious case cannot be permitted effectively to act to insulate it from the consequences of a failure to comply with a preemptory order of the court: MTQ Holdings v Lynch [56].
58 Before applying these principles, it is worth providing a short summary of the parties’ submissions on whether the default judgment in the circumstances of the present case should be set aside.
The Claimant’s Submissions
59 The claimant submitted that the delay between filing her witness statement on 6 January 2026 and service a day later, arose solely because the Registry did not return a sealed copy of the document she lodged until 7 January 2026. The claimant said this timing is something that was beyond her control.
60 The claimant said that she had acted consistently with the Registry’s written directions and did not intentionally delay service. The claimant said she understood the springing order required that she provide the respondent with a stamped (sealed) copy of her witness statement.
61 It was submitted that the claimant had followed the written instructions the Registry provided to her on 7 January 2026 regarding service. The claimant said she did not understand that lodging her witness statement late in the day on 6 January 2026, would place her at risk of non-compliance with the springing order.
62 The claimant said that she did not understand that she was expected to request expedited sealing or otherwise impress urgency upon Registry staff. Based on her previous experience with the Registry, the claimant said she reasonably expected the sealed documents would be returned on the day of lodgement. The claimant submitted that she had relied on the ordinary administrative processes of the Registry and acted promptly once the sealed copy was returned to her.
63 The claimant acknowledged that she did not provide an unsealed copy of her witness statement to the respondent prior to receiving the sealed version. She said this was not done for any tactical or forensic advantage. Rather, she said it was based on her understanding that service should only occur once the document had been sealed by the Court. The claimant submitted that she did not appreciate that providing an unstamped copy as a courtesy, was expected or permissible in the circumstances.
64 The claimant disputed that that the respondent had suffered any significant prejudice because of the delay in serving her witness statement. The claimant submitted that because the respondent’s evidence was not due until 23 January 2026, the length of delay was minimal and would not have prevented the respondent from preparing its case.
65 It was submitted the claimant’s non-compliance with the springing order was minor, unintentional, and arose from the time it took Registry to process her witness statement, rather than any deliberate act or omission on her part.
66 The claimant submitted that dismissing her substantive claim in the circumstances of this case would be a disproportionate response to the delay and prevent the matter from being determined on its merits.
67 The claimant said she believes her witness statement establishes that there is a triable issue and that, on its face, her amended claim has merit.
The Respondent’s Submissions
68 The respondent, in effect, submitted that the claimant’s default application had to be considered in the context of the claimant having already been granted a previous extension of time to file and serve her witness statement(s).
69 The respondent noted the extension of time application, that preceded the making of the springing order was filed some three weeks after the date on which the claimant was previously required to file and serve her evidence. By her extension of time application, the claimant had requested an extension to 6 January 2026.
70 The respondent submitted that it had opposed an extension of time being granted until 6 January 2026 on the grounds the extension would likely cause the hearing of the claim to be delayed, including any adjournment of the January directions hearing.
71 At that time, the respondent had argued that the claimant’s explanation for the delay in filing and serving her witness statement(s) was unsatisfactory, because there was no evidence the claimant had taken any steps to progress the filing of her evidence, other than unsuccessful attempts of contacting prospective legal representation.
72 The respondent submitted that despite its opposition, the Court ultimately granted the claimant’s application for an extension of time on the basis that the respondent had agreed to absorb a truncated timeframe to file its responsive statements. The respondent submitted that this was to ensure the January directions hearing would not be adjourned.
73 In determining whether the Court should exercise its discretion to set aside default judgment under regulation 8(3) of the IMC Regs, the respondent submitted the claimant’s explanation for the delay in serving her witness statement is unsatisfactory.
74 It was submitted the Court’s power to order default judgment would be almost redundant if a defaulting party could succeed in having the order set aside with such a minimal explanation.
75 The respondent submitted the Court should not accept the claimant’s explanation that because she is self-represented, the claimant mistakenly thought she had to wait for the stamped version of her witness statement before serving it on the respondent.
76 It was submitted that the springing order was made in the context of the claimant being selfrepresented. This should therefore not be relied upon as a factor to set aside the default judgment.
77 The respondent submitted that the Court should not accept the claimant’s argument that the respondent has not been prejudiced in providing her the witness statement one full business day late. It was contended the claimant’s argument disregards the extremely tight timeframe the respondent and the Court had agreed upon, so that the claim could proceed without the need to adjourn the January directions hearing.
78 It was submitted that the claimant on her argument was suggesting the respondent could simply absorb another shortened timeframe – perhaps even by working on non-business days to file its evidence.
79 The respondent has maintained that it would be prejudiced if the hearing of an (already drawn out) claim is delayed. Consistent with this, the respondent submitted that it had agreed to a truncated timeframe for filing its responsive evidence to ensure there would be no delay.
80 The respondent submitted that the delay of one business day needs to be viewed in the context of a responsive timeframe that provided a bare minimum turnaround time, and which has resulted in the January directions hearing being vacated and, instead, utilised for the claimant’s default application.
81 It was submitted that if default judgment is set aside, the IMC Regs require the Court to list the claim for a pre-trial conference, which will further prolong the claim and prejudice the respondent.
82 The respondent submitted the requirement for the claimant to provide her witness statements to the respondent by 6 January 2026, did not require the assistance of a legal practitioner to understand.
83 The respondent said it was clear that there was a need for the claimant to provide her witness statements by the due date, so that the respondent had sufficient time to file its responsive evidence by 23 January 2026. Additionally, the effect of the springing order was clear, especially since it was made at a contested hearing where the claimant’s history of non-compliance was discussed.
84 It was submitted the Court had already considered the claimant’s history of non-compliance with its programming orders and exercised its discretion to order that the substantive claim be dismissed if the claimant defaulted on the further extension.
85 The respondent submitted that when exercising this discretion, the Court was aware of the claimant’s lack of legal representation and the prejudice to the claimant that would follow if her claim was dismissed.
86 It was submitted the claimant now seeks for the Court to turn back time and reconsider the exercise of its discretion based on unchanged circumstances. The respondent argued the Court should refuse to set aside default judgment.
Consideration – What Has Changed Since the Springing Order was Made?
87 In deciding whether I should exercise the discretion that is available under regulation 8(3) of the IMC Regs to set aside the default judgment, it is appropriate to consider what, if anything, is different from the circumstances under which the springing order was made.
88 I have noted the claimant, following the making of the springing order has at the very least, progressed her claim by filing her witness statement.
89 When the matter was last before the Court to consider the claimant’s extension of time application, there was no evidence the claimant had made any steps to prepare her witness statements.
90 The respondent is also now on notice that there will only be one witness in support of the claim and that the claimant’s evidence will be confined to what is set out in her witness statement.
Late Service was not Intentional or Contumelious
91 I am not inclined to accept that the late service of claimant’s witness statement was intentional or contumelious.
92 Rather, I am more inclined to the view the claimant had intended to comply with the springing order. This is evident from the filing of her witness statement on the date that it was due: 6 January 2026.
93 I consider that the claimant’s failure to serve her witness statement on time is more the result of an unfortunate confluence of events rather than a deliberate ploy to ignore an order from the Court.
Reason for the Delay
94 I accept that the reason for the claimant’s delay in serving her witness statement is because the claimant honestly believed she was required to serve a sealed copy of her witness statement on the respondent and the claimant could not do this because she did not receive a sealed version from the Registry until a day later.
95 While I consider the claimant would have placed herself in a far better position by filing her witness statement earlier, serving an unsealed version while she waited for Registry staff to provide her with a sealed copy or by letting the Registry staff know her witness statement had to be processed urgently so she could serve it the same day, I can only speculate that taking these steps, would have resulted in a different outcome.
96 In my view, actions of this type are more likely to have been considered by an experienced advocate than an inexperienced unrepresented litigant, even in the circumstances of this case, where the claimant was on notice that if she did not comply with both facets of the springing order, her claim would be dismissed.
Prejudice to the Respondent
97 On the issue of prejudice, while a one-day delay in the context of a truncated timetable is not ideal, I do not consider the delay, having regard to the length and content of the claimant’s witness statement, is so significant, that it would have materially prejudiced the respondent’s compliance with the programming orders or its preparation for the January directions hearing.
98 I have noted the respondent had attached a great deal of significance to the January directions hearing, viewing it more in the nature of a final hearing where the claim could have been finally disposed of.
99 I have also noted the respondent’s submission that if the default judgment is set aside, it will suffer further prejudice because regulation 41(2) of the IMC Regs will require the claim to be referred to a further pre-trial conference, thereby delaying the final determination of the matter.
100 However, this view of the prejudice the respondent would suffer, pre-supposes that the claim was at the stage it could have been disposed of at the January directions hearing or that the Court would not have referred the matter to a further pre-trial conference.
101 By contrast, I am firmly of the view that the claim would have likely been referred to a pre-trial conference at the January directions hearing.
102 I also do not consider the advice the parties were provided, on the purpose of the January directions hearing, as disclosed in the email from the Registry dated 18 November 2025, that I earlier referred to in paragraph [37], suggests it was in the nature of a final hearing.
103 It is on this basis, I am respectfully, not inclined to accept the respondent’s submission that it will suffer a disproportionate prejudice by way of delay, if the default judgment is set aside.
Merits of the Claim
104 Although I do not consider the contents of the claimant’s witness statement suggests that she has a strongly arguable case, there is in my view just enough evidence, to warrant an evidentiary response from the respondent to the allegations in the amended claim and the witness statement she has filed.
Conclusion
105 For all the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, I have concluded by the thinnest of margins, that the default judgment should be set aside.
106 In accordance with regulation 41(2) of the IMC Regs, I will direct that the claim be relisted for a pre-trial conference.
107 In view of my observations on whether the claimant has an arguable case, I would however strongly recommend the claimant (as she said she would) ts 9.
engage a legal representative with experience in employment and industrial law for the pre-trial conference.




T. KUCERA
INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE